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INTRODUCTION: NOW AND AGAIN 
In 2017, more than 6.5% of America’s civilian workforce 
identified as disabled.1 With disability commonplace across our 
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on leave as an accommodation and handled all phases of accommodation- and leave-related 
dispute resolution, up to and including litigation. He received his LL.M. from Harvard Law 
School; his J.D., cum laude, from the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University; 
and his B.S.B.A. with a major in economics from the University of Florida. He would like to 
thank Jane Bestor, Jarod S. Gonzalez, Michael Z. Green, Jasmine E. Harris, Marcy Karin, 
Arthur S. Leonard, Nicole Buonocore Porter, Hina Shah, Jennifer B. Shinall, Sabine Juliette 
Tsuruda, Deborah Widiss, and all of the participants at the 2019 Colloquium for Scholarship 
on Employment and Labor Law for their insightful comments. 
 1. As of 2017, 12.8% of American civilians were disabled, 51.0% of whom were 
“people in the working ages of 18–64,” and 51.0% of 12.8% is 6.528%. LEWIS KRAUS,  
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workplaces, it is no surprise that employees with a disability often 
need leave from work “to attend medical appointments related to 
an episodic or chronic medical impairment,” “obtain medical 
treatment,” or “recuperate from an illness or surgery, or [the] 
exacerbation of symptoms associated with a[] . . . medical 
impairment,”2 after which they generally return to work. When 
employers fail to provide employees with sufficient disability leave 
or threaten to discipline or terminate employees who would take 
such leave, employees often turn to the law for recourse. 
Yet, federal law is lacking in robust workplace leave 
entitlements, including vis-à-vis disability leave. In fact, the only 
federal law to provide leave explicitly to employees on account of 
their own health condition remains the Family and Medical Leave 
Act of 1993 (FMLA),3 which provides certain employees with up to 
twelve workweeks of unpaid leave in any rolling twelve-month 
period “[b]ecause of a serious health condition that makes the 
employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such 
employee.”4 Employees excluded from the FMLA’s coverage 
and/or employees who require more than the FMLA’s rather 
limited twelve-week leave entitlement often turn to the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),5 arguing that employers must 
provide leave as an accommodation under Title I of the ADA’s 
requirement to offer “reasonable accommodations” to employees 
with a disability so long as doing so would not impose an undue 
hardship on business operations.6 
Although Congress declined to mention leave explicitly in Title 
I of the ADA, it directed the agency with oversight over that title, 
 
ERIC LAUER, RACHEL COLEMAN & ANDREW HOUTENVILLE, REHAB. RSCH. & TRAINING CTR. ON 
DISABILITY STAT. & DEMOGRAPHICS, UNIV. OF N.H., 2017 DISABILITY STATISTICS ANNUAL 
REPORT 2 (2018), https://disabilitycompendium.org/sites/default/files/user-
uploads/2017_AnnualReport_2017_FINAL.pdf. 
 2. Leave, JOB ACCOMMODATION NETWORK, https://askjan.org/topics/leave.cfm (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2021). 
 3. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993) 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654). 
 4. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). 
 5. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213). 
 6. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); see also John F. Wymer & Bryan A. Stillwagon, How 
Much Leave Is Enough? Reasonable Accommodation, Undue Hardship, and the Intersection of the 
FMLA and the ADA, 40 EMP. REL. L.J. 22, 22–30 (2014); Jessica B. Summers, The Shifting Law 
Surrounding Leave as a Reasonable Accommodation Under the ADA, 65 FED. LAW. 13, 13–14 (2018). 
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the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),7 to 
“issue regulations . . . to carry out [Title I] . . . .”8 Following that 
directive, on February 28, 1991, the EEOC published a notice of 
proposed rulemaking construing the sorts of accommodations that 
may be required by Title I as including “providing additional 
unpaid leave [beyond accrued paid leave] for necessary treatment,” 
citing congressional reports that ostensibly supported its 
conclusion.9 A few months later, on July 26, 1991, the agency 
promulgated its final rule, once again listing “unpaid leave” as an 
example of an accommodation that may be required by the 
statute.10 From that moment on, employees with a disability  
began requesting, and their employers began granting, leaves as an 
accommodation bounded only by the requirements that such 
leaves be reasonable and impose no undue hardship. Indeed,  
leave has been described as “the most common reasonable 
accommodation” under Title I of the ADA11 with stakeholders 
ranging from the EEOC, the plaintiffs’ bar, and disability-rights 
advocates to employer-industry groups, the management bar, and 
the judiciary nearly ubiquitously endorsing leave as an 
 
 7. Laws Enforced by the EEOC, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 17, 2021) [hereinafter 
Laws Enforced by the EEOC]. 
 8. 42 U.S.C. § 12116. 
 9. Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 
8578, 8595 (Feb. 28, 1991) (citing S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 31 (1989); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 
2, at 62 (1990); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 39 (1990)). The first and third of these reports 
do not support the proffered proposition. Senate Report 116 addresses, inter alia, part-time 
and modified work schedules and states that the law “does not entitle the individual with a 
disability to more paid leave time than non-disabled employees,” but it does not 
affirmatively address leave as an accommodation. S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 31. In the same vein, 
House Report 485(III) (the House Judiciary Report) addresses, inter alia, part-time and 
modified work schedules, but says nothing of leave as an accommodation. H.R. REP. NO.  
101-485, pt. 3, at 39. Only House Report 485(II) (the House Labor Report) actually supports 
what the EEOC says it supports. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 62. See infra section I.B for a 
discussion of the legislative history of leave as an accommodation. 
 10. Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 
35,726, 35,744 (July 26, 1991) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. (2021)). See the explanation 
of 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) for this discussion. 
 11. Leave of Absence Is Not Accommodation of First Resort, LEAVE & DISABILITY 
COORDINATION HANDBOOK NEWSL., March 2001 (summarizing statement of David Fram at 
the National Employment Law Institute’s Employment Law Conference 2000); accord Desda 
Moss, How and Why You Can Create Reasonable Accommodations, HRNEWS (Jun. 20, 2017) 
(stating that the “most common types” of accommodations include “allowing leave time”). 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 46:6 (2021) 
1492 
accommodation subject only to the reasonableness and undue 
hardship guardrails.12 
In this Article, I challenge that conventional proposition. More 
specifically, I argue that disability leave—even when it is 
reasonable and imposes no undue hardship on the employer—is 
not always required under Title I of the ADA and similar statutes. 
Viz., I contend that employers never need to provide 
accommodations to employees who presently cannot work13 on 
account of their disability or for any other reason, including when 
such employees need leave as an accommodation. In contrast, 
subject to the reasonableness and undue hardship inquiries, I argue 
that employers must accommodate only those employees who 
presently can work, but who choose to take disability leave instead 
of working. In other words, as with all accommodations, leave 
requests should not only be vetted to confirm: (1) their general 
reasonableness, and (2) that this specific leave will not impose an 
undue hardship on this employer, but also to confirm that (3) at the 
time of the leave’s inception, the employee can perform the 
essential functions of the job but takes disability leave in lieu of 
work, and (4) there exists a reasonable possibility of the employee 
returning to work. In other words, employees must be able to work 
now and again. By interposing these elements into the disability 
accommodation framework, I posit that some reasonable leaves 
imposing no undue hardship are legally required, whereas others 
are not. 
To begin defending this provocative thesis, Part I presents a 
holistic, descriptive analysis of federal disability accommodation 
law, delving into statutory and regulatory texts, as well as their 
announced and implied purposes; legislative histories; and 
administrative agency, judicial, scholarly, and practitioner 
interpretations thereof. This Part proceeds to conduct a linguistic 
examination of the relevant statutory and regulatory texts which 
 
 12. See generally infra section I.C to see the widespread support for this conventional 
belief. For further information concerning the reasonableness and undue hardship inquiries, 
see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401–02 (2002). 
 13. Throughout this Article, I routinely use the word “work” for easy reading instead 
of tracking the cumbersome statutory language each and every time (i.e., “perform the 
essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds”). See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12111(8). This substitution is intended for brevity’s sake only and is not meant to have 
import. Quite obviously, an inability to work is not the same thing as an inability to perform 
the essential functions of the position as the latter could still imply an ability to work in 
another position. 
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has never been undertaken, a paramount element in the analyses of 
a growing-textualist judiciary. It also provides a unique exploration 
of the level of deference that courts must afford agency 
interpretations endorsing disability leave as an accommodation. 
This Part also digs deeper into the legislative history of the federal 
disability accommodation statutes than previous scholarship, 
citing and analyzing sources never before discussed in employment 
law scholarship for the proposition that leave may be required as 
an accommodation, at least some of the time. Finally, Part I clarifies 
the lower courts’ burgeoning and confused debates over disability 
leave as an accommodation and situates this Article’s thesis within 
the debate over indefinite leave and long-term disability leave as 
accommodations, the last of which was recently considered by the 
Supreme Court in a petition for certiorari that was ultimately 
denied, hopefully allowing the lower courts sufficient time to 
pursue clarity. 
Part II takes the conclusion of Part I to be true. That is, assuming 
arguendo that Title I of the ADA and the other federal disability 
accommodation statutes do not require employers to provide leave 
as an accommodation when, at the start of the leave, the employee 
cannot perform the essential functions of the job, how can we 
harmonize such a construction with the remainder of federal law? 
To that end, this Part contextualizes leave as an accommodation for 
employees with a disability by comparing it with leave as an 
accommodation for employees’ religious practices and beliefs 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)14 and  
part-time and modified work schedules as accommodations for 
employees with a disability under the ADA. In sum, Part II resolves 
that this Article’s thesis works within the larger structure of  
federal law. 
Finally, Part III concludes with a call to action. A broad 
entitlement to disability leaves as accommodations carries great 
normative appeal. Indeed, all employers (not just those covered by 
the ADA and similar statutes) should provide all of their workers 
(including their independent contractors and not just their 
employees) with disability leave whenever possible to ensure their 
workers’ ability to maintain gainful work once the need for leave 
abates without the imposition of unnecessary costs on all parties 
 
 14. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 255 (1964) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17). 
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(e.g., job search costs for the worker, costs of recruiting for and 
backfilling the position for the employer, costs to the family related 
to the unemployment of a family member). Moreover, it benefits 
society as a whole to both encourage prompt and proper medical 
treatment of disabilities and to optimize workplace utility by 
ensuring that adept workers perform their jobs. In short—disability 
leave, as an accommodation, is good. 
And, yet, we live in an era where fidelity to statutory text is 
respected out of convenience and not out of principle.15 We should 
abide by the text of all our laws, even those with which we disagree. 
I chose to write this Article not only to call attention to the rampant 
misinterpretation of federal law which, in and of itself, would  
be worthy of scrutiny, but specifically because my normative  
views oppose what I contend to be an accurate interpretation of the 
law. Disability leave should be accommodated even when an 
employee presently cannot work, but I argue that federal law does 
not yet entitle employees to such an accommodation, even when it 
would be reasonable and impose no undue hardship. Put another 
way, commitment to the text of the ADA should outweigh the 
normative appeal of a flawed interpretation of the ADA. It is my 
hope that those who read this Article will not only be convinced by 
my substantive argument addressing disability leaves as 
accommodations, but also will take with them my conviction that 
fidelity to the statutory text compels us to reach this Article’s 
conclusion on one hand while reaching for a phone to urge 
Congress to amend that statute with the other. Title I of the ADA 
must be amended to explicitly provide accommodations to anyone 
who “can or may be able to perform” the essential functions of the 
position, thus permitting leave as an accommodation for 
employees with a disability even if those employees cannot, at 
present, do the job. 
Prompt legislative action is necessary to codify a broad right of 
workers with a disability to take leave as an accommodation before 
the courts inflict a damaging and destabilizing, albeit accurate, 
 
 15. See generally Jason Scott Smith, How Kellyanne Conway’s Rules Violations Threaten 
Democracy, WASH. POST (July 2, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/ 
2019/07/02/how-kellyanne-conways-rules-violations-threaten-democracy/; Garrett Epps, 
What Pleases Trump Has the Force of Law, ATLANTIC (May 19, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/05/trump-doesnt-care-about-constitution/ 
589654/; Steve Denning, How Trump’s Cabinet Now Undermines the Rule of Law, FORBES (May 
19, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2019/05/19/how-trumps-cabinet-
now-undermines-the-rule-of-law/. 
1495 Now and Again 
 1495 
blow to Title I of the ADA and similar laws by concluding that they 
do not require such leave when employees presently cannot work. 
In sum, I intend this Article to serve as a blinking warning light, 
hopefully exposing a dangerous eventuality for American 
employees that should be rectified promptly by Congress and the 
President before the Supreme Court eliminates a right that most 
observers assume the law already guarantees, leaving behind 
countless employees with a disability who rely on leaves of absence 
to remain valuable components of our workforce. 
I. DISABILITY LEAVE AS AN ACCOMMODATION 
Analyzing whether and when federal law requires employers 
to provide employees with unpaid leave16 as an accommodation 
requires untangling an intricate, often overlapping web of statutes, 
rules and regulations that purport to implement those statutes, 
subregulatory guidance from the agencies that administer those 
statutes, and judicial decisions interpreting the foregoing morass. 
This Part explains why textual fidelity to the disability 
accommodation statutes in the workplace—more specifically, Title 
I of the ADA; sections 501 and 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
(the Rehab Act);17 and the Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment 
Assistance Act of 1974 (VEVRAA)18—demands the conclusion that 
they do not obligate employers to provide disability leave as an 
accommodation to employees who cannot work at the time the 
leave would begin. Of vital import to that conclusion are the 
statutory and regulatory definitions of the term “qualified,” which 
use the present-tense verbs “can” or “has” or the gerund noun 
“having,” each instance of which is italicized in section I.A.1.  
for easy reference before they are analyzed in greater detail in 
section I.A.2–3. 
A. Statutory and Regulatory Text 
This section proceeds first with a cataloging of statutory and 
regulatory support for the proposition that leave may be required 
 
 16. No federal laws mandate paid leave to all, or even most, American workers. Thus, 
all leave referenced in this Article is unpaid leave. 
 17. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Title V, §§ 501, 503, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 
(1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793). 
 18. Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, Title IV, § 402, Pub. 
L. No. 93-508, 88 Stat. 1593 (1974) (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4212). 
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as an accommodation in certain circumstances; I present those 
sources objectively and without analysis at first. Subsequently, I 
analyze these sources to explain why certain leaves are not required 
accommodations. Finally, I consider what deference may be owed 
to agency interpretations that support, conflict with, or clarify 
statutory text. 
1. Cataloging the law 
To begin, Title I of the ADA prohibits any “covered entity,” 
which is defined as public or private employers with fifteen or 
more employees (excluding the United States and a few other 
entities that are immaterial to this analysis), employment agencies, 
labor organizations, and joint labor-management committees from 
discriminating against a “qualified individual” on the basis of 
disability.19 That prohibition includes “not making reasonable 
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an 
otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is 
an . . . employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that 
the accommodation would impose an undue hardship.”20 Title I 
defines “qualified individual” as “an individual who, with or 
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential 
functions of the employment position that such individual holds.”21 
The EEOC has promulgated two regulations implementing Title I 
of the ADA stating that leaves of absence, under certain 
circumstances not delineated by the regulations, may be required 
accommodations for qualified individuals: (1) ”an employee with 
an impairment that previously limited, but no longer substantially 
limits, a major life activity may need leave . . . to permit him or her 
to attend follow-up or ‘monitoring’ appointments with a health 
care provider”22; and (2) ”an employer, in spite of its ‘no-leave’ 
policy, may, in appropriate circumstances, have to consider the 
provision of leave to an employee with a disability as a reasonable 
accommodation, unless the provision of leave would impose an 
undue hardship.”23 The EEOC’s voluminous subregulatory 
 
 19. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (emphasis added); see also id. § 12111(2) (defining “covered 
entity”), (5)(A) (defining “employer”), (5)(B) (excluding the United States and other entities 
from the definition of “employer”). 
 20. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (emphasis added). 
 21. Id. § 12111(8) (emphases added). 
 22. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(3) (2021). 
 23. Id. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.15(b)–(c) (“Disparate Impact Defenses”). 
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guidance confirms the agency’s conviction that Title I of the ADA, 
as well as its implementing regulations, require leave as an 
accommodation at least some of the time.24 
Similarly, section 501 of the Rehab Act prohibits disability 
discrimination by the federal government,25 and section 504 
clarifies that no “otherwise qualified individual with a disability” 
shall, solely by reason of disability, be excluded from the 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under, any federal program or activity or any 
program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.26 The 
Rehab Act defines “individual with a disability” by incorporating 
the definition from the ADA,27 but unlike Title I of the ADA, the 
Rehab Act does not define the term “qualified.” Like Title I of the 
ADA, the EEOC administers section 501 of the Rehab Act,28 and 
although the EEOC has not promulgated any regulations explicitly 
stating that leave may be an accommodation under section 501,29 
the EEOC’s subregulatory guidance confirms that the agency views 
sections 501, 503 (discussed below), and 504 of the Rehab Act as 
 
 24. Employer-Provided Leave and the Americans with Disabilities Act, U.S. EQUAL EMP. 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/ada-leave.cfm (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2021) (“An employer must consider providing unpaid leave to an employee 
with a disability as a reasonable accommodation if the employee requires it, and so long as 
it does not create an undue hardship for the employer . . . .”) [hereinafter EEOC’s ADA Leave 
Website]; U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC-CVG-2003-1, ENFORCEMENT 
GUIDANCE: REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS 
WITH DISABILITIES ACT ¶¶ 17–20 (2002) [hereinafter EEOC Accommodation Enforcement 
Guidance], https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/enforcement-guidance-reasonable-
accommodation-and-undue-hardship-under-ada; U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
EEOC-NVTA-2008-3, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: APPLYING PERFORMANCE AND 
CONDUCT STANDARDS TO EMPLOYEES WITH DISABILITIES (2008), https://www.eeoc.gov/ 
facts/performance-conduct.html [hereinafter EEOC Performance and Conduct Standards]; 
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC-M-1A, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL 
ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
§ 3.10(4), at 63–64 (1992), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED352763.pdf. 
 25. 29 U.S.C. § 791 (preempted with respect to airport security screeners as stated in 
Joren v. Napolitano, 633 F.3d 1144, 1146 (7th Cir. 2011)); see also Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 
193 (1996) (“[Section] 501 of the Rehab Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791, . . . prohibits discrimination on 
the basis of disability in employment decisions by the Federal Government.”). 
 26. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (emphasis added). 
 27. Id. § 705(20)(B) (“The term ‘individual with a disability’ means, for purposes of . . . 
subchapter[] . . . IV . . . of this chapter [which includes Sections 501, 503, and 504 of the Rehab 
Act], . . . any person who has a disability as defined [in the ADA].”). 
 28. Laws Enforced by the EEOC, supra note 7. 
 29. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203 (2021) (Rehab Act regulations). 
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requiring leave as an accommodation, at least in some cases,30 even 
though the EEOC does not administer the provisions of section 503 
or the provisions of section 504 unrelated to employment 
discrimination.31 Similarly, the U.S. Office of Personnel 
Management’s Federal Personnel Manual states that, before a 
federal agency fires an employee with a disability who “no longer 
can perform the duties of his or her position efficiently and safely,” 
it should consider granting to that employee “a liberal grant of 
leave without pay when paid leave is exhausted.”32 
In a similar vein to section 501 of the Rehab Act, Presidents 
Clinton and Obama signed executive orders regarding 
accommodations for federal employees, although none of the 
orders mention leave.33 However, the EEOC published two 
subregulatory guidance documents for one of those orders—
Executive Order 13,164.34 In one of those guidance documents, the 
EEOC asks, “Are there steps an agency can take prior to receiving 
a request for reasonable accommodation that will avoid 
unnecessary delays in responding if a request is made?”, to which 
it replies: 
 
 30. EEOC’s ADA Leave Website, supra note 24 (“This document also applies to Federal 
employees protected under section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act, which has the same non-
discrimination requirements as the ADA.”); EEOC Accommodation Enforcement Guidance, 
supra note 24, at 2 n.1 (“The analysis in this guidance applies to federal sector complaints of 
non-affirmative action employment discrimination arising under section 501 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 29 U.S.C. § 791(g) (1994). It also applies to complaints of non-
affirmative action employment discrimination arising under section 503 and employment 
discrimination under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 793(d), 794(d) 
(1994).”). 
 31. Laws Enforced by the EEOC, supra note 7. 
 32. Rodgers v. Lehman, 869 F.2d 253, 258 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing U.S. OFF. OF PERS. 
MGMT., FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL § 339-1-3(b) (1979)). Note that this provision contains 
a recommendation (i.e., “should”), not a mandate. Id. 
 33. See Exec. Order No. 13,548, 75 Fed. Reg. 45,039 (July 26, 2010), reprinted in 29 U.S.C. 
§ 791; Exec. Order No. 13,163, 65 Fed. Reg. 46,563 (July 26, 2000), reprinted in 29 U.S.C. § 791; 
Exec. Order No. 13,164, 65 Fed. Reg. 46,565 (July 26, 2000), reprinted in 29 U.S.C. § 791. 
 34. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC-CVG-2001-2, POLICY GUIDANCE 
ON EXECUTIVE ORDER 13164: ESTABLISHING PROCEDURES TO FACILITATE THE PROVISION OF 
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION (2000) [hereinafter EO 13164 Policy Guidance], 
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/policy-guidance-executive-order-13164-
establishing-procedures-facilitate-provision; U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: POLICY GUIDANCE ON EXECUTIVE ORDER 13164: ESTABLISHING 
PROCEDURES TO FACILITATE THE PROVISION OF REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION (2000), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/federal-sector/questions-and-answers-policy-guidance-executive-
order-13164-establishing-procedures. 
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 Yes. To anticipate and limit impediments that may cause 
unnecessary delay in providing reasonable accommodation, 
agencies should review and modify, in advance of a specific 
request, policies that might affect the agency’s ability to respond 
promptly to requests for reasonable accommodation. Among the 
policies that agencies should review are those that affect . . . the 
flexibility to approve leave . . . .35 
Based on this document and the EEOC’s other subregulatory 
guidance on section 501 of the Rehab Act,36 it is clear that the agency 
views section 501 and/or its regulations as imposing on federal 
agencies the obligation to provide leave as an accommodation at 
least under certain circumstances. 
Section 503 of the Rehab Act does not, itself, prohibit 
discrimination based on disability status, but rather it requires 
federal contracts and subcontracts for the procurement of personal 
property and nonpersonal services in excess of $10,000 to contain a 
provision “requiring that the party contracting with the United 
States shall take affirmative action to employ and advance in 
employment qualified individuals with disabilities.”37 Hence, it is  
by operation of contract that such federal contractors and 
subcontractors are prohibited from engaging in discrimination 
based on disability status, although many firms big enough to 
secure a contract or subcontract with the federal government likely 
are already barred from engaging in such discrimination by Title I 
of the ADA.38 The agency that administers section 503, the U.S. 
Department of Labor’s (DOL) Office of Federal Contract 
Compliance Programs (OFCCP),39 has promulgated regulations 
implementing section 503 confirming that 
[i]t is unlawful for the contractor to fail to make reasonable 
accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations  
of an otherwise qualified applicant or employee with a 
disability . . . unless such contractor can demonstrate that the 
 
 35. EO 13164 Policy Guidance, supra note 34, ¶ 15. 
 36. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Title V, § 501, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 791). 
 37. 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (emphasis added). 
 38. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12111(2). 
 39. Jurisdiction Thresholds and Inflationary Adjustments, U.S. OFF. OF FED. CONT. 
COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, https://www.dol.gov/ofccp/taguides/jurisdiction.htm (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2021) [hereinafter OFCCP, Jurisdiction Thresholds]. 
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accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the 
operation of its business.40 
Those regulations define “qualified individual” as one “who satisfies 
the requisite skill, experience, education, and other job-related 
requirements of the employment position such individual holds or 
desires, and who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can 
perform the essential functions of such position.”41 The regulations 
themselves list leave as an accommodation: “Other reasonable 
accommodations of this type may include . . . providing additional 
unpaid leave for necessary treatment.”42 
VEVRAA, too, does not prohibit discrimination explicitly, but 
rather it requires that federal contracts and subcontracts for the 
procurement of personal property and nonpersonal services in 
excess of $100,000 contain a provision “requiring that the party 
contracting with the United States take affirmative action to employ 
and advance in employment qualified covered veterans,”43 where 
“qualified” means “having the ability to perform the essential 
functions of the position with or without reasonable 
accommodation for an individual with a disability,”44 and the 
definition of “covered veteran” includes “[d]isabled veterans.”45 
Therefore, like section 503 of the Rehab Act, it is by operation of 
contract that such federal contractors and subcontractors are barred 
from engaging in discrimination based on covered veteran status, 
although the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment 
Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA),46 likely would prohibit such 
discrimination as well.47 Moreover, the subset of “[d]isabled 
veterans” protected by VEVRAA would almost always be 
protected by Title I of the ADA48 and section 503 because the 
monetary threshold triggering VEVRAA exceeds that of section 
 
 40. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.21(a)(6) (2021) (emphasis added); see also U.S. OFF. OF FED. CONT. 
COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 1G04, at 42–43 (2021), 
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/OFCCP/FCCM/508_FCCM_05012020.pdf 
[hereinafter OFCCP, FCCM]. 
 41. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2(r) (emphases added). 
 42. Id. pt. 60-741 app. A, § 7. 
 43. 38 U.S.C. § 4212(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
 44. Id. § 4212(a)(3)(B) (emphases added). 
 45. Id. § 4212(a)(3)(A)(i). 
 46. Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, Pub. L. 
No. 103-353, 108 Stat. 3149. 
 47. See 38 U.S.C. § 4311. 
 48. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2). 
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503.49 As with section 503, the OFCCP administers VEVRAA50 and 
has promulgated regulations implementing it stating that 
[i]t is unlawful for the contractor to fail to make reasonable 
accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an 
applicant or employee who is a qualified disabled veteran [among 
others], unless such contractor can demonstrate that the 
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the 
operation of its business.51 
In turn, those regulations define “qualified disabled veteran” as  
one who “has the ability to perform the essential functions of  
the employment position with or without reasonable 
accommodation.”52 Furthermore, like the regulations 
implementing section 503 of the Rehab Act, VEVRAA’s regulations 
explicitly list leave as a permissible accommodation without 
clarifying when VEVRAA requires it: “Other reasonable 
accommodations of this type may include . . . providing additional 
unpaid leave for necessary treatment.”53 
Finally, the standards applicable to Title I of the ADA and 
sections 501 and 503 of the Rehab Act are materially identical. 
Indeed, Title I of the ADA ensures that all complaints filed under it 
and operative sections of the Rehab Act are “dealt with in a manner 
that . . . prevents imposition of inconsistent or conflicting 
standards.”54 Moreover, section 501(a) of the ADA confirms that 
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided in [the ADA], nothing in [the 
ADA] shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the 
standards applied under [the applicable title of the Rehab Act] or 
the regulations issued by [f]ederal agencies pursuant to such 
title.”55 Similarly, sections 501, 503, and 504 of the Rehab Act state 
that the “standards used to determine whether [these sections 
have] been violated in a complaint alleging employment 
discrimination under [these sections] shall be the standards applied 
under title I of the [ADA].”56 
 
 49. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 793(a), with 38 U.S.C. § 4212(a)(1). 
 50. OFCCP, Jurisdiction Thresholds, supra note 39. 
 51. 41 C.F.R. § 60-300.21(f)(1) (2021) (emphasis added); see also OFCCP, FCCM, supra 
note 40, § 1H04, at 48–49. 
 52. Id. § 60-300.2(s) (emphases added). 
 53. Id. pt. 60-300 app. A. 
 54. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(b). 
 55. Id. § 12201(a). 
 56. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791(f), 793(d), 794(d). 
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2. Interpreting the text 
In this section, I present four hypothetical employees to whom 
I return as touchpoints throughout my analysis: (1) Ada (A), who 
works as an inventory stocker and injures her back at work, 
exacerbating an undiagnosed condition and forcing her to leave 
work immediately, so she cannot work until she undergoes back 
surgery and recovers from it several months from now;57 (2) Brenda 
(B), who works as an on-air radio personality, gets diagnosed with 
an esophageal tumor and needs surgery sometime in the next few 
weeks to remove it, during which she would be placed under 
general anesthesia, but she can work until her surgery and after a 
few months of recovery;58 (3) Carlos (C), who works as a prison 
guard, suffers from an anxiety disorder that causes him to suffer a 
panic attack at work lasting twenty minutes, rendering him 
unexpectedly, temporarily, and completely unable to do his job;59 
and 4) Dinesh (D), who works as a design manager, suffers from 
bipolar disorder and needs to leave work for a few hours to attend 
a single doctor’s appointment sometime in the near future for a 
consultation, but he can work until the appointment and after it.60 
If accommodating the non-work described in these four 
scenarios were reasonable and imposed no undue hardship, and 
the employers were covered by a relevant statute (e.g., Title I of the 
ADA), a conventional analysis would conclude that employers 
must accommodate C (i.e., short-term, involuntary non-work) and 
D (i.e., short-term, voluntary61 non-work). Until recently, a 
conventional analysis likewise would conclude that the employers 
also must accommodate A (i.e., long-term, involuntary non-work) 
 
 57. These facts materially track those in Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc., 872 F.3d 
476 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 58. These facts materially track those in Soria v. Univision Radio L.A., Inc., Cal. App. 5th 
570 (2016), although I added the fact of B being placed under general anesthesia to highlight 
an example where an employee can perform the essential functions of the job at the start of 
the leave, but physically cannot do so at some point during the leave. 
 59. These facts materially track those in Smith v. Leis, No. 97-3373, 1998 WL 739881  
(6th Cir. Oct. 8, 1998), although I altered the disability from a seizure disorder to an anxiety 
disorder to showcase how disabilities rendering employees mentally and/or emotionally 
incapacitated are materially identical for our purposes to disabilities rendering employees 
physically incapacitated, as with employee A. 
 60. These facts materially track those in Nieman v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 07-CV-12629, 
2008 WL 4940585 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 17, 2008). 
 61. Later in this section, I contend with the degree to which attending a medically 
necessary doctor’s appointment or other similar acts are truly voluntary. 
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and B (i.e., long-term non-work, the starting date of which was 
discretionary) so long as the employee could identify a return-to-
work date given that many courts have concluded that indefinite 
leave would be unreasonable.62 Recently, however, more and more 
courts have held that A and B need not be accommodated on 
account of the long-term nature of their leave.63 I contend that the 
conventional analysis, as well as the modern gloss thereon 
invoking long-term leaves, belies the statutory text. Instead of 
accommodating C and D with certainty and potentially 
accommodating A and B, I contend that these statutes require 
employers to accommodate B and D (i.e., employees taking leaves 
with a discretionary start time), subject, as always, to the 
reasonableness and undue hardship inquiries, and never require 
employers to accommodate A and C (i.e., employees taking leave 
involuntarily, regardless of whether that leave is for a few minutes 
or several months). Here’s why. 
The statutory text of Title I of the ADA limits accommodations 
only to “qualified individual[s],” meaning those who “can perform 
the essential functions of the [job].”64 The word “can,” as used in this 
definition, is a present-tense verb—a present-tense, auxiliary verb 
with indicative mood and dynamic modality, to be exact65—used to 
express present-tense ability, meaning a qualified individual is one 
who presently has the ability to (i.e., can) perform the essential 
functions of the job. To that end, in dictionaries published around 
the enactment of the ADA, as well as in more-modern dictionaries, 
the word “can” is always denoted as being in the present tense and 
never in the future tense.66 Put in the terms of the “plain meaning” 
 
 62. See, e.g., infra note 176 and accompanying text. 
 63. See, e.g., infra notes 179–180, 183, 186, and accompanying text. 
 64. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (emphases added). 
 65. García-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 655 (1st Cir. 2000) (O’Toole, 
J., dissenting) (citing this language as the present tense and indicative mood); cf. Can, OXFORD 
DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH GRAMMAR (2d ed. 2014) (citing as an example of dynamic modality, 
“Nadine can read a novel in an evening,” as attributing the ability to read to Nadine) 
(emphasis in original); Can, 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (denoting the word 
“can” as having the present tense, being an auxiliary verb, and having indicative mood). 
 66. Can, NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010); Can, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2004); 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 65. The 
word “can” appears in several editions of Black’s Law Dictionary, but they do not specify its 
tense. See Can, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009); Can, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th 
ed. 1999); Can, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (Rev. 4th ed. 1968). 
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doctrine,67 a person can do something if they are able to do it now. 
An individual who might, should, or will be able to perform the 
essential functions of the job at some time in the future—be that a 
few minutes or several months from now—is not a qualified 
individual under Title I of the ADA unless that individual presently 
can perform the essential functions of the job. Indeed, the ADA 
could have defined a qualified individual as “an individual who, 
with or without reasonable accommodation, can or may be able to 
perform the essential functions of the job,” but the ADA does not 
say that. 
Now, consider this linguistic analysis in the context of an 
employee requesting leave as an accommodation. Is a request for 
leave, ipso facto, a concession of the employee’s inability to perform 
the essential functions of the job presently? In some cases—yes. 
Both A and C in the scenarios above cannot work right now. Even 
if their employers demanded (cruelly, to be sure) that they work 
notwithstanding their disability, they would be unable to comply 
on account of a back injury preventing physical work and an 
incapacitating panic attack, respectively. Focusing on the text of the 
ADA and its use of the present-tense verb “can,” these employees 
presently cannot work, meaning they are not “qualified 
individual[s]” under the statute at the time that their 
accommodation would begin, so their employers need not 
accommodate their leave. Yet, not all cases of leave imply a present-
tense inability to perform the essential functions of the position. 
Indeed, B and D can work now, even if it may be against medical 
best practices for them to do so. To that end, B and D both need 
time off—several months for B; just a few hours for D—sometime 
in the near future (i.e., leave doesn’t need to start right away, in the 
strictest sense of the word “need”). Accordingly, B and D can 
perform the essential functions of their jobs at the time they would 
take leave, even if they choose not to, meaning they are “qualified 
individual[s],” so their employers must accommodate them, 
subject to the reasonableness and undue hardship inquires. Not all 
cases will be as clear cut, thereby necessitating fact finding, but the 
boundary between permissible and impermissible leave is the 
present-tense ability to perform the essential functions of the job. 
 
 67. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 69–77 (2012) (“Words are to be understood in their ordinary, everyday 
meanings—unless the context indicates that they bear a technical sense.”). 
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One might ask whether the statement, “Can I go to the store 
tomorrow?” implies a future-tense ability (i.e., “Yes, you can go to 
the store tomorrow.”), thereby undercutting the contention that 
“can” always denotes a present-tense ability. As demonstrated by 
dictionaries cited herein, the parenthetical reply to my hypothetical 
question is, in fact, an expression of a present-tense ability to 
undertake a future action (i.e., “Yes, right now, you have the ability 
to go to the store tomorrow.”). If you were to ask instead, 
“Tomorrow, will I have the ability to go to the store?”, the only 
proper response would be, “I don’t know.” 
Yet, what legitimate purpose behind the ADA, expressed or 
theoretical, could support the inclusion of accommodations for 
employees who can work at the time the accommodation would 
begin and the exclusion of accommodations for employees who, 
potentially through no fault of their own, cannot? I contend that a 
preference for the continuity of business operations over flexibility 
for employees with a disability is such a purpose. That is, while 
section I.B, infra, demonstrates the congressional silence on any 
express purpose animating disability leave as an accommodation 
that might guide our path, a theoretical purpose behind providing 
such leave only to those employees who can work at the time of the 
accommodation could be affording flexibility to employees with a 
disability only when their employers can be provided enough time 
to get their affairs in order before leave begins. After all, before an 
employee begins leave, an employer may need to shuffle schedules, 
engage temporary replacements, adjust service levels and customer 
expectations, and otherwise ensure business continuity during the 
leave. Through this lens, A and C—through no fault of their own—
gave their employers no time to ensure that business would carry 
on during their leave. In contrast, B and D can work with their 
employers and plan to start leave once business continuity is 
ensured, presuming that the leave is reasonable and imposes no 
undue hardship. Now, does this interpretation provide the optimal 
balance of employees’ and employers’ interests? Nowhere near it! 
Employers’ interests in ensuring that their business sufficiently 
continues during a disability leave should kowtow to their 
employees’ interests in taking disability leave, especially when 
such leave was necessitated through no fault of the employee. But 
such a value judgment is not mine to make. It is what the text 
demands, and it is reasonable. That is enough. 
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But, can the demarcation that I propose withstand practical 
scrutiny? That is, I draw a line at the voluntariness of the leave—
involuntary leaves implying, ipso facto, that the employee suddenly 
and unexpectedly cannot perform the essential functions of the 
position and is thereby excluded from being a “qualified 
individual” under the ADA, and voluntary leaves implying the 
opposite, viz., that the employee has the discretion whether to take 
leave, meaning the employee can work right now if he or she 
chooses. So, are the sorts of leave requested by B and D above truly 
voluntary? In a way, no, because they present the employees with 
an untenable hard choice of caring for their welfare or working a 
job that, in many cases, is necessary for their welfare.  
In this way, perhaps it is somewhat involuntary that B and D 
take leave, even if the start date and time of that leave remains in 
their discretion, which would imply that they, too, cannot perform 
the essential functions of their jobs because, at some point, they will 
be compelled into non-work by their disability. Does this imply that 
Title I of the ADA excludes from its scope all leaves of absence 
because no employees needing leave can perform the basic 
functions of their jobs? I argue that such an extreme position lacks 
logical mooring. Borrowing from the “difficult choice” 
voluntariness line of argument from criminal law jurisprudence 
and scholarship, “[a] strong, but not completely overpowering, 
compulsion is analogous to duress,” which “is not involuntary.”68 
Put another way, the decision to continue to work in these cases is 
voluntary because it “may be unwilling, but it is not unwilled.”69 
Thus, both B and D are voluntarily able to work, meaning they are 
qualified individuals, whereas A and C are compelled involuntarily 
into non-work, meaning they are not. 
Ostensibly, further support for this conclusion can be found in 
the EEOC’s enforcement guidance, which provides that, because 
“reasonable accommodation is always prospective, an employer is 
not required to excuse past misconduct [(e.g., an unapproved 
absence)] even if it is the result of the individual’s disability.”70 
 
 68. Ian P. Farrell & Justin F. Marceau, Taking Voluntariness Seriously, 54 B.C. L. REV. 
1545, 1609 (2013) (italics removed). 
 69. See Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching 
for Its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1360 (1989) (citations omitted). 
 70. EEOC Accommodation Enforcement Guidance, supra note 24, at 25 ¶ 36. 
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Ample case law supports this contention.71 As applied here, the 
involuntariness of A and C’s incapacitating leaves implies that they 
began their putative accommodations before requesting them, 
meaning that any accommodation would necessarily need to be 
retroactive. Therefore, one would expect the EEOC to oppose 
involuntary leaves as an accommodation.  
However, confusingly, the EEOC’s enforcement guidance cites 
at least two cases putatively involving involuntary leaves as 
examples of where an employer should have provided leave as  
an accommodation.72 In all likelihood, the EEOC excused the 
involuntariness of these leaves and the retrospective nature of the 
accommodation because the employers clearly knew that the 
employees had a disability, could not work on account of it, and 
could not request the necessary accommodation prior to availing 
themselves of it.73 Thus, I would not point to the statements  
made by the EEOC and these courts opposing retroactive 
accommodations as support for my thesis as they could 
counterargue that what they really meant was that accommodations 
are not required when employers lack knowledge of an employee’s 
disability, the employee’s inability to work, and the employee’s 
inability to request an accommodation because of that disability. 
Instead, I reiterate that the permissible purpose animating my 
reconceived analytic of the ADA (i.e., ensuring the continuity of 
business operations) also animates the gut instinct of the EEOC and 
these courts—an instinct supported only by policy considerations 
 
 71. Dewitt v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 845 F.3d 1299, 1316 (10th Cir. 2017); McElwee v. Cnty. 
of Orange, 700 F.3d 635, 641 (2d Cir. 2012); Hill v. Kansas City Area Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 
891, 894 (8th Cir. 1999); Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 319 (5th Cir. 1997); Siefken v. 
Vill. of Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664, 666–67 (7th Cir. 1995); Isley v. Aker Phila. Shipyard, 
Inc., 275 F. Supp. 3d 620, 631 (E.D. Pa. 2017). 
 72. EEOC Accommodation Enforcement Guidance, supra note 24, at 16 n.55 (citing 
Matthews v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 128 F.3d 1194 (7th Cir. 1997)), 18 n.63, 24 n.98 (citing 
Ralph v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 135 F.3d 166 (1st Cir. 1998)). According to the district court 
opinion in Matthews, the plaintiff “suffered a severe heart attack and was forced to leave 
ComEd temporarily due to his medical condition.” Matthews v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 
941 F. Supp. 721, 722–23 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (emphasis added). In Ralph, the plaintiff was 
accommodated with four weeks of part-time work due to a “mental breakdown” that 
rendered him “able to attend work only briefly [thereafter].” Ralph, 135 F.3d at 168 (emphasis 
added). Oddly, the EEOC cited to Ralph, a case involving a part-time work schedule 
accommodation, in support of leave as an accommodation. 
 73. Cf. EEOC Accommodation Enforcement Guidance, supra note 24, 26–27 ¶ 40 
(relating these elements as the conditions under which employees need not initiate a request 
for an accommodation). 
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and not by any citations to statutory text, I note—that the ADA does 
not require retroactive accommodations. 
The EEOC regulations implementing Title I of the ADA support 
the notion that some leaves may qualify as accommodations 
whereas other leaves may not. Indeed, the regulations provide only 
that an employee “may need leave . . . to permit him or her to attend 
follow-up or ‘monitoring’ appointments with a health care 
provider”74 (as was the case for employee D and which I contend 
the statute already mandated without the need of such a regulation) 
and that “an employer . . . may, in appropriate circumstances, have 
to consider the provision of leave to an employee with a disability 
as a reasonable accommodation, unless the provision of leave 
would impose an undue hardship.”75 The second of these 
regulations should be read not only as permitting the interpretation 
that I have forwarded, as the first regulation does, but as 
supporting it. Under a conventional analysis, an employer must 
accommodate an employee with disability leave if it is reasonable 
and imposes no undue burden. However, this regulation presumes 
a leave that is both reasonable and imposes no undue hardship, and 
yet it does not say that the employer must provide such an 
accommodation; it says an employer “may, in appropriate 
circumstances,” need to do so. The only plausible reading of this 
regulation is that reasonable leaves that impose no undue hardship 
sometimes are permissible (e.g., when the employee presently can 
perform the essential functions of the position) and, other times, are 
impermissible (e.g., when the employee cannot). 
Some courts have invoked the “essential functions” language 
from Title I of the ADA to reach a similar end, concluding that 
“regular and reliable attendance is an essential function of most 
jobs,” in which cases the employees requesting leave are unqualified 
and leave cannot be an accommodation.76 On the other hand, the 
EEOC and a minority of courts have held that, in all circumstances, 
attendance “is not an essential function as defined by the ADA 
 
 74. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(3) (2021) (emphasis added) (quotations in original). 
 75. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.15(b)–(c) (“Disparate Impact Defenses”). 
 76. Rachel L. Berry & Sara J. Robertson, Four Circuits Agree: Regular and Reliable Attendance 
Is an Essential Job Function, NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/ 
article/four-circuits-agree-regular-and-reliable-attendance-essential-job-function (collecting 
cases); accord Franklin J. Rooks, Jr., Employee Absences and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
32 J. MED. PRAC. MGMT. 98, 99 (2016) (“Leave as a reasonable accommodation would seem to 
run contrary to the assertion that regular attendance is an essential job function.”). 
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because it is not one of ‘the fundamental job duties of the 
employment position.’”77 Respectfully, these courts and the EEOC 
are engaging in a debate with a flawed premise, rendering the 
debate itself moot. Title I of the ADA defines a “qualified 
individual” as one who “can perform the essential functions of the 
employment position,”78 even if the employee is not performing 
those essential functions at present because the employee is on 
leave. The debate over regular attendance as an essential function 
of the job makes sense only if we replace the word “can” in the 
statute with the word “will.” If we ask whether an employee will 
perform the essential functions of the job while on leave, the 
obvious answer is, “no, the employee will not work during  
non-work (i.e., while on leave).” This truism leads the EEOC to note 
that “essential functions,” is undefined by Title I of the ADA, 
meaning the agency’s regulations interpreting that phrase as “the 
fundamental job duties of the employment position”79 should be 
given controlling deference. From those accurate statements, the 
EEOC argues that “job duties” presumes that the employee is 
working in the first place, so attendance cannot be an essential 
function of any job, meaning a lack of attendance cannot be 
grounds upon which to construe an employee as being unqualified. 
In other words, as per the EEOC, the employee will perform the 
essential functions of the job after the leave. Both sides of this 
debate are wrong. Having the ability to perform and performing 
are different things. We need not ask whether an employee on leave 
will be performing the “essential functions” of the job after the 
leave, necessitating an interpretation of what “essential functions” 
means; we need only ask whether an employee who takes leave can 
perform the essential function of the job, even if the employee 
chooses not to do so. 
I also want to address a potential ambiguity uncovered by my 
analysis. I argue that, in the scenarios above, both B and D must be 
accommodated with leave. There is no doubt that D, who is taking 
leave to attend a doctor’s appointment, can perform the essential 
 
 77. EEOC Accommodation Enforcement Guidance, supra note 24, at 18 n.65 (quoting 
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)); see generally James A. Passamano, Employee Leave Under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act and the Family Medical Leave Act, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 861 (1997); 
Audrey E. Smith, The “Presence Is an Essential Function” Myth: The ADA’s Trapdoor for the 
Chronically Ill, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 163 (1995). 
 78. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (emphasis added). 
 79. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). 
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duties of the job at all times during his leave. He is never 
incapacitated. He remains lucid and able-bodied. He could, 
theoretically, be called into work at the drop of a hat to perform the 
essential functions of his job, and he would be able to comply. 
Indeed, D would be just as able to work during his doctor’s 
appointment as an employee asleep in bed at night, away from the 
office, who uses a screen reading tool to accommodate his poor 
vision at the office. They both can work, even if they are not doing 
so presently, so they both remain qualified. Not so with B. Recall 
that B needs to take leave to undergo tumor-removal surgery and 
recovery. While she can perform the essential functions of her job 
now and at all times leading up to the leave, as well as when she 
concludes her recovery, there will, at least, be a period of time 
during her leave when she will be under anesthesia and literally 
unable to work, if she were asked to do so. Parts of her recovery 
may also render her physically, mentally, or emotionally incapable 
of coming to work and doing her job, even if she were compelled 
to try. How, then, does she remain a “qualified individual” 
throughout the life of her accommodation?  
To answer that question, consider another hypothetical 
employee, Elie (E), who works as a soccer coach and develops 
migraines if she is overly exposed to sunlight. Her employer 
accommodates her by allowing her to coach only indoor games 
inside a company-operated building abutting some outdoor fields. 
However, after her employer’s profits decline, it forfeits its lease of 
the building, forcing it to operate only on the outdoor fields, 
potentially forcing it to terminate E because she cannot work 
outside for long periods of time.80 Although E was able to perform 
the essential functions of the job at the start of her accommodation, 
that changed during the life of the accommodation. She went from 
being qualified to being unqualified. As such, E’s employer would 
be within its rights to terminate her employment after losing the 
ability to let her work indoors, assuming, of course, that it 
sufficiently engaged in the interactive process to try to otherwise 
accommodate E, but failed. Would the same not be true of B? B also 
went from being qualified to being unqualified during the life of 
 
 80. This employer would be obligated to engage in an interactive process to attempt 
other means of accommodating E such as part-time work, installing structures that provide 
shade, allowing E to coach pre-dawn or post-dusk games, etc. Assume, for argument’s sake, 
that the employer engaged in this process and attempted to accommodate E in good faith, 
but failed. 
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her accommodation—that is, when B went under anesthesia during 
surgery, could not leave her bed post-surgery, and was otherwise 
incapacitated during her leave. During those times, B could not have 
performed the essential functions of her job. In that case, would B’s 
employer be legally obligated to accommodate her by providing 
her leave to start her surgery, knowing full-well that it could 
terminate her as soon as she went under anesthesia? Similarly, must 
an employer accommodate a nurse with Alzheimer’s disease who 
needs an early shift to avoid sundowning81 (i.e., a modified work 
schedule) knowing full-well that it could rescind that 
accommodation after his shift ends at the point when he 
experiences sundowning and, therefore, cannot perform the 
essential functions of his job? 
Of course not! It would be patently absurd to require an 
employer to provide leave to an employee when both the employer 
and the employee know with certainty that, during that life of that 
leave, the employer could lawfully be permitted to rescind it and 
fire the employee. To be clear, it would be reasonable, albeit  
ill-advised, to craft a law that does not require an employer to 
accommodate an employee with any disability leave at all if the 
employee would, during that leave, be unable to perform the 
essential functions of that position; perhaps the legislature values 
an employer’s ability to force employees to work over the needs of 
employees with a disability, for example. Conversely, it would also 
be reasonable, and a good idea, for a law to require an employer to 
accommodate an employee with disability leave even if the 
employee will or may become unable to perform the job during the 
leave. What is unreasonable and something that no reasonable 
legislature could have intended is requiring an employer to allow 
disability leave to begin when that employer can fire the employee 
during the pendency of that leave. 
In cases where the text of a statute yields such ambiguity, we 
must turn to administrative agency guidance for aid. See, infra 
section I.A.3, for my analysis of deference to the EEOC here,  
which ultimately concludes that Title I of the ADA, as interpreted 
in the EEOC’s subregulatory guidance, requires leave as an 
 
 81. Sundowning: Late-Day Confusion, MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/ 
diseases-conditions/alzheimers-disease/expert-answers/sundowning/faq-20058511 (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2021). 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 46:6 (2021) 
1512 
accommodation in cases like that of B, who is qualified when her 
leave begins but becomes unqualified during that leave. 
However, that is not to say that employers must continue to 
provide disability leave when the employee becomes unable to 
perform the essential functions of the job during the leave and there 
is no reasonable possibility of that employee ever being able to do 
so again. In such cases, employees may want to remain employed 
not because of the prospect of returning to work, but because 
employee benefits may extend to an employee on disability leave, 
depending on how the employer treats employees taking similar 
leaves,82 and employees may want to remain employed to honestly 
list continued employment on their résumés. However, it would be 
unreasonable to require an employer to accommodate an employee 
in this manner when there is no reasonable chance of the employee 
working for that employer ever again. Note that this differs in 
degree from employees who request indefinite leave but who may 
be able to return to work eventually.83  
I will note, for the sake of completeness, that one may be drawn 
to criticize the thesis of this Article on the grounds that it 
(1) perversely encourages employees to try to work even if they 
should be treating their disability instead and (2) appears to 
perversely authorize employers to encourage employees to delay 
the start of their voluntary disability leave, which would often 
mean delaying necessary or recommended medical treatment. I 
wholeheartedly agree with the first criticism. Under my analysis, 
employees with a disability would be encouraged to try to prove 
an ability to work just so they can qualify for leave. For example, in 
the scenarios above, A might try to grit and bear it by coming into 
work despite excruciating back pain to ensure that she earns the 
right to take leave (lest she be designated unable to perform her job 
and lose that right), possibly exacerbating her condition in the 
process. It is awful public policy to discourage the medical 
treatment of disabilities and encourage employees to make them 
worse in the name of business continuity. However, it is reasonable 
 
 82. Amber Clayton, When Do Group Health Plan Benefits Terminate for an Employee  
Who Is Not on Federal Family and Medical Leave Act Leave?, HR MAG. (July 2014), 
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/tools-and-samples/hr-qa/pages/ 
whendogrouphealthplanbenefitsterminateforanemployeeonanonfmlaleaveofabsence.aspx 
(“If an employee is on leave as a reasonable accommodation under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA), an employer must continue an employee’s health insurance benefits 
during the leave if it does so for other employees on similar leave.”). 
 83. See, e.g., infra note 176 and accompanying text. 
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to come to such a conclusion, and democracy demands adherence 
to laws borne of awful public policy.  
That said, I disagree with the second criticism. My thesis 
advances no such incentive because the ADA already permits 
employers to provide an alternative accommodation that meets the 
needs, not the wants, of the employee.84 As perverse as it may 
sound, an employer already can delay an employee’s requested 
start date for disability leave so long as that start date sufficiently 
accommodates the employee’s disability; the employer does not 
even need to point to the requested start date imposing an undue 
hardship to effectuate such a delay. As the EEOC’s enforcement 
guidance states, “If there are two possible reasonable 
accommodations, and one costs more or is more burdensome than 
the other, the employer may choose the less expensive or 
burdensome accommodation as long as it is effective . . . .”85 
One final corollary of my argument deserves attention. The 
FMLA affords to eligible employees the right to take twelve weeks 
of leave “[b]ecause of a serious health condition that makes the 
employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such 
employee.”86 The italicized language including employees within 
the FMLA’s scope is materially identical to the language excluding 
employees from the ADA’s scope. Hence, employees taking FMLA 
leave for their own serious health condition are, by their own 
admission, “unable to perform the functions of the position,” 
meaning they are “unqualified individual[s]” under the ADA. This 
is true regardless of whether they have a “disability” or not.87 
Therefore, the commonly accepted belief that reasonable ADA 
leave that imposes no undue hardship must be tacked on to the end 
of FMLA leave based on an employee’s serious health condition88 
 
 84. EEOC Accommodation Enforcement Guidance, supra note 24, at 9 ¶ 9 (“The 
employer may choose among reasonable accommodations as long as the chosen accommodation 
is effective.”). 
 85. Id. 
 86. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D) (emphasis added). 
 87. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 825.102 (2021) (defining “serious health condition”), with 42 
U.S.C. § 12102(1) (defining “disability”). See also 29 C.F.R. § 825.702(b) (explaining the relevant 
interaction between the FMLA and ADA). 
 88. EEOC’s ADA Leave Website, supra note 24 (example 11); Tracie DeFreitas, ADA 
Leave Beyond FMLA, 12 JOB ACCOMMODATION NETWORK, no. 3, 2014 https://askjan.org/ 
articles/ADA-Leave-Beyond-FMLA.cfm (last visited Feb. 22, 2021). ADA leave would not 
commonly follow other forms of FMLA leave (e.g., leave for childbirth or caring for certain 
family members with a serious health condition) because the employee would not 
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is wrong. As demonstrated herein, because such an employee 
would not be able to work at the start of the accommodation  
(i.e., the end of the FMLA leave), the employee is unqualified for an 
accommodation. I justify such a categorical conclusion as 
reasonable based on business continuity rationales similar to the 
rationale that could justify my thesis. Employees taking 
involuntary FMLA leave for their own serious health condition, 
which is permitted since FMLA leave can be designated 
retroactively,89 certainly invoke such a rationale. The employer 
cannot ensure continuity of business operations if an employee 
leaves involuntarily to take FMLA leave; tacking ADA leave on to 
the end of that leave merely makes things worse for the employer. 
Moreover, reasonable legislators could view employees taking 
voluntary FMLA leave for their own serious health condition as 
telling their employers to plan for twelve week of leave and no 
more; legislators could consider leave as an accommodation 
beyond those twelve weeks to be less valuable than an employer’s 
right to fill the position permanently. Such purposes unjustly tip 
the scales too far in favor of management at employees’ expense, 
but such poorly conceived value judgments are reasonable in  
and of themselves, and the statutory text requires as much, so we 
must acquiesce. 
With this reconceived analytic of the ADA in mind, consider the 
remainder of the federal disability accommodation statutes. Per the 
statutory text of all operative sections of the Rehab Act, the 
standards used to assess violations of the Rehab Act are the same 
as those applied under Title I of the ADA,90 and, lest there be  
any doubt, the regulations implementing section 503 limit 
accommodations only to “qualified individual[s],” meaning those 
who “can perform the essential functions of such position.”91 As 
such, an employee who cannot work and requests leave is also not 
qualified under any section of the Rehab Act, meaning employers 
need not accommodate the request. The regulations implementing 
 
necessarily have a disability triggering the ADA’s accommodation requirements. However, 
an employee taking FMLA leave for such reasons who is also unable to work (e.g., an 
employee who develops incapacitating postpartum depression midway through her twelve 
weeks of FMLA childbirth leave) would likewise be (cruelly) unqualified for ADA leave after 
the FMLA leave concludes. 
 89. 29 C.F.R. § 825.301(d). 
 90. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12117(b), 12201(a); 29 U.S.C. §§ 791(f), 793(d), 794(d). 
 91. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2(r) (emphases added). 
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section 503 of the Rehab Act, like those implementing Title I of the 
ADA, do not alter this analysis as they state that leave may be an 
accommodation, but do not clarify when.92 
The text of VEVRAA limits accommodations only to “qualified 
covered veterans,” meaning individuals “having the ability to 
perform the essential functions of the position.”93 As used in the 
statutory text, “having” is either a present participle verb or a 
gerund noun.94 In either sense, the word “having” must be 
construed in the present tense either explicitly (as a present 
participle verb) or impliedly (as a gerund noun) because, at the  
time an employee would need leave, that employee cannot be 
amongst those individuals “having” the ability to perform the 
essential functions of the position. In a similar vein, VEVRAA’s 
implementing regulations confirm that “qualified” means one who 
“has the ability to perform the essential functions of the 
employment position.”95 As used in the regulatory text, “has” is  
the third-person singular conjugation of the verb “to have” in the 
present tense and indicative mood, meaning to presently possess 
the ability, as an attribute, quality, faculty, or function.96 Once 
again, the statutory and regulatory texts’ use of present-tense  
verbs or gerund nouns mean that employees who cannot work  
and request leave are not “qualified” under the statutes and 
regulations. Finally, like the regulations implementing section  
503 of the Rehab Act, the regulations implementing VEVRAA 
confirm this Article’s thesis as they list leave as a permissible 
accommodation without clarifying the conditions under which it is 
permissible.97 For these reasons, under VEVRAA, just as with Title 
 
 92. 41 C.F.R. pt. 60-741 app. A, § 7. 
 93. 38 U.S.C. § 4212(a)(3)(B) (emphases added). 
 94. Compare Having, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2002) 
(defining “having” as a present participle verb), and Having, 7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 
supra note 65 (same), with Devon Balwit, How to Use “Being” and “Having” as Gerunds, 
PORTLAND ENG. LANGUAGE ACAD., https://portlandenglish.edu/blog/how-to-use-being-
and-having-as-gerunds/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2021) (defining “having” as a gerund  
noun), and Martine Johnston, Using Gerunds and Infinitives, UNIV. OF TORONTO, 
https://advice.writing.utoronto.ca/english-language/gerunds/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2021) 
(same). See also CAMBRIDGE GRAMMAR OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1220–22 (Cambridge 
Univ. Press. 2002) (English lacks a material distinction between present participle verbs and 
gerund nouns). 
 95. 41 C.F.R. § 60-300.2(s) (emphases added). 
 96. Has, NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY, supra note 66; Has, 6 OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY, supra note 65; Have, 7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 65. 
 97. 41 C.F.R. pt. 60-300 app. A, § 7. 
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I of the ADA and all relevant sections of the Rehab Act, employers 
need not accommodate disability leave when the employee 
presently cannot work. 
Accordingly, when it comes to an employee’s ability to work, 
there are two requirements imposed by the federal disability 
accommodation statutes—requirements implied by the title of this 
Article. An employee must be able to work now (i.e., the present-
tense ability to perform the essential functions of the job) and again 
(i.e., a reasonable likelihood of the ability to work again eventually, 
but not necessarily soon). These two requirements, when 
considered in tandem with the reasonableness and undue hardship 
inquiries, constitute the textually accurate analytical framework for 
disability leave as an accommodation under federal law. 
3. Heeding the guidance 
Administrative agencies like the EEOC and the OFCCP are 
entitled to a certain level of deference to their interpretations of the 
statutes that they administer so long as Congress has not spoken 
directly on the issue at hand and, in cases of statutory silence or 
ambiguity, as long as the interpretation is permissible.98 Assuming 
congressional silence or statutory ambiguity and a permissive 
agency interpretation, the level of deference owed to the agency  
is absolute where the agency’s interpretation carries the force of  
law (e.g., via congressionally authorized regulations) (Chevron 
deference),99 whereas deference owed to the agency is lesser—more 
akin to a court considering persuasive authority—where its 
interpretation does not carry the force of law (e.g., agency websites, 
enforcement guidance, technical assistance manuals, regulations 
promulgated absent congressional authority) (Skidmore deference 
or Skidmore weight).100 
Recall that Title I of the ADA, the Rehab Act, and VEVRAA 
compel four conclusions elucidated by the four hypothetical 
employees: A and C (i.e., employees taking involuntary leave) are 
not qualified individuals, meaning employers need not 
 
 98. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 99. Id.; see also Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). 
 100. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944), superseded by statute on other 
grounds as stated in Bridges v. Empire Scaffold, LLC, 875 F.3d 222, 228 (5th Cir. 2017); see also 
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court 
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083,  
1188 (2008). 
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accommodate them with leave, whereas B and D (i.e., employees 
taking voluntary leave, at least at the time the leave starts) are 
qualified individuals, meaning they qualify for leave as an 
accommodation. Everyone agrees that the law may require leave as 
an accommodation for D, so I’ll proceed to the trickier cases. 
Regarding employees A and C, deference would be irrelevant 
with respect to the EEOC’s regulations implementing Title I of  
the ADA and the OFCCP’s regulations implementing section 503  
of the Rehab Act and VEVRAA as those regulations merely restate 
what the statutes already imply—viz., that leave can be an 
accommodation some of the time.101 To that end, none of these 
regulations say when leave is a required accommodation. 
Accordingly, any regulatory deference notwithstanding, my 
conclusion vis-à-vis employees A and C remains untouched so  
far. Conflict only arises regarding A and C upon review of the  
EEOC’s subregulatory enforcement guidance, which does not  
carry the force of law,102 yet contends that involuntary leaves such  
as these may nonetheless qualify as an accommodation. To be  
clear, that guidance does not explicitly state that “involuntary 
leaves do not render an employee unqualified” or anything of the 
sort, but the guidance cites at least two cases involving involuntary 
leaves as examples of employers that should have provided leave 
as an accommodation.103 The EEOC’s website on accommodating 
 
 101. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(k)(3); id. pt. 1630 app. § 16.30.15(b)–(c); 41 C.F.R. pt. 60-741  
app. A, § 7; id. pt. 60-300 app. A, § 7; see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.702(b). The DOL, an agency 
without Congressional authority to promulgate regulations interpreting the ADA, has 
similarly endorsed disability leave as an accommodation generally in a regulation 
implementing the FMLA—”the ADA allows an indeterminate amount of leave, barring 
undue hardship, as a reasonable accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.702(b). 
 102. See Townsend v. Benjamin Enters., Inc., 679 F.3d 41, 53 (2d Cir. 2012); EEOC v. U.S. 
Steel Corp., No. 10-1284, 2013 WL 625315, at *21 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2013). The EEOC’s 
regulations implementing Title I of the ADA, on the other hand, do carry the force of law. 
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 478–79 (1999), superseded by statute on other 
grounds, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). Some 
courts have also opined that “[d]eference to the EEOC regulations [implementing Title I of 
the ADA] is also appropriate when reviewing claims brought under [the federal employment 
provisions of] the Rehabilitation Act,” Badwal v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of D.C., 139 F. Supp. 3d 
295, 308 n.9 (D.D.C. 2015) (citation omitted), and that the OFCCP’s regulations implementing 
section 503 of the Rehab Act carry the force of law, Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. 
v. Shiu, 30 F. Supp. 3d 25, 35 (D.D.C. 2014), aff’d, 773 F.3d 257 (D.C. Cir. 2014), whereas no 
court has considered the level of deference owed to VEVRAA’s implementing regulations. 
However, given that deference to any regulations carrying the force of law is unnecessary 
here, I decline to analyze these lines of cases further. 
 103. See supra note 72. 
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leave buttresses those citations with an example involving 
involuntary leave.104  
Yet, even if we give the EEOC the benefit of the doubt and 
construe its subregulatory guidance as opposing my conclusions 
with respect to A and C, it would not matter. Because the relevant 
statutes exclude employees who take involuntary leaves from the 
definition of who is “qualified” for accommodations for the reasons 
explained, supra, those statutes have not “explicitly left a gap for an 
agency to fill,”105 meaning agency guidance endorsing such leave 
as an accommodation is impermissible, and there is no need to 
weigh the degree of Skidmore deference or weight owed to such 
guidance. Similarly, even if the EEOC were to promulgate revised 
regulations permitting involuntary leave as an accommodation, 
they would fail under Chevron for lack of permissibility given the 
statutory text to the contrary. If these statutes were lacking in such 
exclusionary language, courts would likely still give the EEOC’s 
enforcement guidance some weight because, “while not controlling 
upon the courts by reason of [its] authority, [it] do[es] constitute a 
body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and 
litigants may properly resort for guidance.”106 However, because 
there are no statutory gaps here, the EEOC’s subregulatory 
guidance, like its regulations, are moot. 
Regarding employee B, none of the regulations cited herein 
clarify whether leave can be an accommodation for an employee 
who takes leave that starts out as voluntary but during which the 
employee is rendered completely unable to perform the essential 
functions of the job. The regulations merely state that leave can be 
an accommodation without clarifying when. Once again, it is not 
until we review subregulatory enforcement guidance that we 
discern some degree of clarity, even if we must dig to find it once 
again. In its enforcement guidance, the EEOC fails to explicitly 
 
 104. EEOC’s ADA Leave Website, supra note 24 (example 11). 
 105. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984); 
accord United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001). 
 106. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). Theoretically, the EEOC would 
not be entitled to deference to its interpretation of section 503 of the Rehab Act because it 
does not administer that statute, and the EEOC does not purport to interpret VEVRAA. 
However, if courts were to defer to the EEOC’s subregulatory guidance addressing Title I of 
the ADA, section 503 of the Rehab Act contains language confirming that it is to be 
interpreted under the same standards as Title I of the ADA, 29 U.S.C. § 793(d), so any 
theoretical lapse in Skidmore deference or weight owed to the EEOC regarding its 
interpretation of section 503 would be moot. 
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support the belief that the law requires employers to accommodate 
leaves that start out voluntary during which the employee may or 
will become unable to work; after all, the EEOC does not contend 
that employees’ present-tense ability to work matters, so why 
would it cite such examples?107 However, as I noted in the 
preceding paragraph, that guidance cites at least two cases 
involving involuntary leaves as examples of where employers 
should have provided leave as an accommodation, plus a similar 
example from the EEOC’s website, meaning the employees in  
those situations were unable to perform the essential functions  
of the position at the start of the leave and at some time during  
that leave, if not throughout the leave entirely. It is the latter part  
of that proposition that carries us across the finish line, albeit 
barely. The EEOC posits that the law requires leave as an 
accommodation even when the employee is unable to do the job 
during the leave—precisely the situation that faces employee B. 
Because the statute itself is ambiguous concerning employees that 
start out qualified but become unqualified during their leave, and 
the regulations also offer no clarity, we must defer, per Skidmore, to 
guidance suggesting that the law requires leave as an 
accommodation even when an employee is unqualified at some 
time during the leave of absence, subject to the reasonableness  
and undue hardship inquiries. After all, generally, the greater (i.e., 
belief that leave may be required when an employee is unable to 
perform the essential functions of the position at the start of the 
leave and during leave) includes the lesser (i.e., belief that leave  
may be required when an employee cannot perform the essential 
functions of the position during leave).108 Accordingly, to be clear, 
we must defer to the EEOC’s enforcement guidance as applied  
to employee B only because the statute and the regulations  
are ambiguous; where the statutes and regulations are clear, as  
they are when applied to employees A and C, such deference is  
not warranted. 
 
 107. The EEOC does state that leave “is a form of reasonable accommodation when 
necessitated by an employee’s disability,” EEOC Accommodation Enforcement Guidance, 
supra note 24, at 14 (emphasis added), but the voluntary leave taken by B, during which she 
would be under general anesthesia, is also necessitated by her disability. The necessity of the 
leave does not necessarily imply an inability to work at some point during leave. 
 108. See Michael Herz, Justice Byron White and the Argument that the Greater Includes the 
Lesser, 1994 BYU L. REV. 227 (1994). 
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To be fair, the EEOC could state its position with far-greater 
clarity as one could argue, rightly, I might add, that the EEOC is 
silent on leave as an accommodation when an employee is qualified 
at the beginning of a leave and becomes unqualified during its 
pendency. However, beggars can’t be choosers. Unless and until 
the EEOC promulgates contradictory regulations or issues 
alternative guidance, there is no further clarity vis-à-vis employee 
B to be gleaned in any source beyond a pure appeal to sound public 
policy, which I argue supports providing disability leave to all 
employees who need it anyway, not just those like employee B.  
It is worth briefly analyzing the provision in the ADA that 
purports to subsume, as part of its statutory text, regulations issued 
by agencies interpreting the Rehab Act. As you may recall, section 
501(a) of the ADA states that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in 
[the ADA], nothing in [the ADA] shall be construed to apply a 
lesser standard than the standards applied under [the applicable 
title of the Rehab Act] or the regulations issued by [f]ederal agencies 
pursuant to such title.”109 On its face, section 501(a) of the ADA 
purports to elevate the regulations promulgated by the OFCCP—for 
example, the regulation construing leave as an accommodation 
under section 503 of the Rehab Act110—to the same level as a statute, 
thereby creating an ostensible right for the OFCCP to promulgate 
new regulations permitting involuntary leave as an 
accommodation under section 503 and imbue such regulations with 
the force of a statute. 
However, Congress cannot delegate legislative power to an 
agency to exercise an “unfettered discretion” to create laws.111 In 
contrast, “[i]f Congress shall lay down by legislative act an 
intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to 
[interpret it] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not  
a forbidden delegation of legislative power.”112 Section 501(a) of  
the ADA offers no such intelligible principle. Rather, because  
it ostensibly vests with an agency the legislative authority 
delegated only to Congress by Article I of the Constitution, the 
 
 109. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (emphasis added). 
 110. 41 C.F.R. pt. 60-741 app. A, § 7 (2021). 
 111. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537–38 (1935). 
 112. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928); see also Whitman 
v. Am. Trucking Assocs., 531 U.S. 457, 458 (2001) (“An agency cannot cure an unlawful 
delegation of legislative power by adopting in its discretion a limiting construction of  
the statute.”). 
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provision of section 501(a) of the ADA that purports to elevate 
agency regulations to the level of a statute is unconstitutional. 
Indeed, as Justice Scalia once noted, “A law that simply stated ‘it 
shall be unlawful to do ‘X’, however ‘X’ shall be defined by an 
independent agency,’ would seem to offer no ‘intelligible principle’ 
to guide the agency’s discretion and would thus raise very serious  
delegation concerns . . . .”113 
B. Legislative History 
Legislative history confirms that leave can be an 
accommodation at least some of the time, but that history fails to 
clarify when. To that end, I proceed chronologically in analyzing 
the history of the Rehab Act (1973), VEVRAA (1974), and finally the 
ADA (1990) to explain whether and when Congress believed that 
leave could be an accommodation. 
Both the Rehab Act and VEVRAA have their roots in helping 
American soldiers with a disability integrate back into civilian life 
after returning from war. After World War I, the 65th Congress 
passed and President Wilson signed the first federal law to provide 
help to employees with a disability, the Vocational Rehabilitation 
Act of 1918,114 which assisted veterans in dealing with their 
disabilities when they came home.115 The new law proved so 
successful that federally funded programs for veterans with a 
disability continued to expand throughout the twentieth century116 
leading up to March 1, 1971, when Sen. Jennings Randolph 
introduced a new bill that would ultimately replace the Vocational 
Rehabilitation Act of 1918—the Rehab Act.117 In 1972 and then 
again in early 1973, Congress passed similar versions of the bill that 
would ultimately become the Rehab Act only to have President 
Nixon veto both of them,118 leading to protests in Washington.119 A 
 
 113. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 695 n.10 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (citing J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co., 276 U.S. at 409). 
 114. Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-178, 40 Stat. 617 (1918). 
 115. 1 HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT HANDBOOK 490–91 
(4th ed. 2003). 
 116. Id. 
 117. S. 1030, 92d Cong. (1971). 
 118. Vetoes by President Richard Nixon, U.S. SENATE https://www.senate.gov/ 
reference/Legislation/Vetoes/NixonR.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2021) (citing vetoes of S.7, 
93d Cong., 1st Sess. and H.R. 8395, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.). 
 119. Disabled Tie Up Traffic Here to Protest Nixon Aid‐Bill Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1972, 
at 43. 
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few months later, in 1973, after further wrangling between 
Congress and the White House, Congress passed and President 
Nixon finally signed the Rehab Act.120 
Since the Rehab Act’s enactment in 1973, sections 501 and 503 
have been amended multiple times.121 Yet, nowhere in the 
legislative history of the Rehab Act or its amendments does a 
legislator or congressional report state or suggest, even once, that 
leaves of absence are accommodations required by the Rehab Act 
(or its regulations, for that matter). On the contrary, legislators and 
congressional reports sometimes listed the sort of accommodations 
that sections 501 and 503 of the Rehab Act and/or its regulations 
ostensibly require without listing leave as an example.122 
Occasionally, legislators and their witnesses at hearings stated that 
sections 501 and 503 and/or their regulations generally required 
accommodations,123 but no one argued that leave may be required 
as an accommodation. In hearings on Rehab Act amendments, 
 
 120. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973). 
 121. Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-128, Title IV, 
§ 456(a), 128 Stat. 1675; Rosa’s Law of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-256, § 2(d)(3), 124 Stat. 2643; 
Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-435, Title VI, § 604(d), 
120 Stat. 3242; Workforce Investment Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-220, Title III, § 341(c), Title 
IV, § 408(a)(1), 112 Stat. 1092, 1202; Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. No.  
103-73, Title I, § 112(a), 107 Stat. 727; Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 
102-569, Title I, § 102(p)(29), (31), Title V, §§ 503, 505, 106 Stat. 4360, 4424, 4427; Veterans 
Housing, Memorial Affairs, and Technical Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-54, 
§ 13(k)(1)(B), 105 Stat. 276; Handicapped Programs Technical Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. 
L. No. 100-630, Title II, § 206(a), (c), 102 Stat. 3310, 3312; Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, Title I, § 103(d)(2)(B), (C), Title X, §§ 1001(f)(1)–(3), 1002(e)(1), 
(e)(2)(A), (e)(3), 100 Stat. 1810, 1843, 1844; Rehabilitation Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-221, Title I, § 104(b)(3), 98 Stat. 18; Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and 
Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, Title I, § 122(d)(1),  
92 Stat. 2987. 
 122. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 102-357, at 78; 138 CONG. REC. S16608-05, S16611 (1992), 
(statement of Sen. Tom Harkin). 
 123. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 98-298, at 13 (“[C]ontractors are required . . . to make 
accommodations to the disabilities of employees or applicants unless undue hardship would 
result . . . .”); Oversight Hearings on Rehabilitation of the Handicapped Programs and the 
Implementation of Same by Agencies Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 Before the S. Subcomm. 
on the Handicapped of the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong. 1593 (1976) (statement 
of Lawrence Z. Lorber, Deputy Asst. Sec’y Dir., OFCCP) (“[Under ‘our new regulations,’ 
[c]ontractors are also required to make reasonable accommodations to workers’ handicaps.”); 
121 CONG. REC. 32911, 32913 (1975) (statement of Sen. Chris Dodd) (“[The DOL] issued 
regulations (20 C.F.R. [§] 741) . . . to implement section 503. . . . The regulations require, [i]n 
part, that . . . [f]ederal contractors and subcontractors with contracts exceeding $2,500 take 
affirmative action to employ and advance [i]n employment qualified handicapped persons, 
[i]ncluding . . . actions to accommodate physical and mental limitations of employees.”). 
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some witnesses listed accommodations to which employees with a 
disability should be legally entitled, including leave,124 and 
accommodations that employers have provided to employees 
irrespective of legal obligations (which sometimes included leave125 
and sometimes did not126). However, nowhere will you find a 
legislator, or anyone else for that matter throughout this entire 
legislative history, opining that the Rehab Act and/or its 
regulations require employers to provide disability leave as an 
accommodation even some of the time. Rather, on multiple 
occasions, the same Congresses that passed substantive 
amendments to sections 501 and 503 of the Rehab Act failed to pass 
bills that would have explicitly required certain employers to 
provide leave to certain employees.127 
The lack of any legislator citing leave as an accommodation 
throughout the history of sections 501 and 503 of the Rehab Act and 
its amendments offers no guidance as “congressional silence lacks 
persuasive significance.”128 In contrast, Congress’s failure to pass 
explicit employee leave bills during the sessions in which it 
considered substantive amendments to the Rehab Act arguably 
supports the conclusion that the statutory text of the Rehab Act does 
not require leave as an accommodation under any circumstances. 
 
 124. See, e.g., Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on the Select Education of the Comm. on 
Education and Labor, 99th Cong. 105 (statement of Barbara Hoffman, Esq., Foundation for 
Dignity, Cancer Patients Employment Rights Project) (“Employees who are undergoing 
treatment for cancer may need a leave of absence or reduced work hours.”). 
 125. See, e.g., Field Hearing on Reauthorization of the Rehabilitation Act Before the H. 
Subcomm. on Select Education of the Comm. on Education and Labor, 102d Cong. 57, 61 (statement 
of Rehabilitation Specialist and Caregiver Jacqueline Rotteveel). 
 126. See, e.g., Oversight and Reauthorization Hearing on the Rehabilitation Act of 1983 Before 
the H. Subcomm. on Select Education of the Comm. on Education and Labor, 98th Cong. 295–96 
(1983) (statement of the United Cerebral Palsy Association, Inc.). 
 127. An earlier version of the FMLA was introduced in and passed by the 102nd 
Congress but was vetoed by President George H.W. Bush. Family and Medical Leave Act,  
S. 5, 102d Cong. (1991). This is the same Congress to pass the Rehabilitation Act Amendments 
of 1992, H.R. 5482, 102d Cong., which amended sections 501 and 503 of the Rehab Act when 
President Bush signed it into law, Pub. L. No. 102-569, 106 Stat. 4344. A bill that would have 
“[e]ntitle[d] employees to temporary medical leave . . . in cases involving inability to work 
because of a serious health condition” was introduced in the 100th Congress. Parental and 
Medical Leave Act, S. 2488, 100th Cong. (1988). This is the same Congress to pass the 
Handicapped Programs Technical Amendments Act of 1988, H.R. 5334, 100th Cong. (1988), 
section 206(a) of which amended section 501 of the Rehab Act when President Reagan signed 
it into law, Pub. L. No. 100-630, 102 Stat. 3289. See also Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 
1992, H.R. 5482, 102d Cong.; Handicapped Programs Technical Amendments Act of 1988, 
H.R. 5334, 100th Cong. 
 128. Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 121 (1994). 
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VEVRAA was born out of veterans from a different era 
returning from war. During the height of the Vietnam War and the 
height of the 1972 Presidential election, Congress passed and 
President Nixon signed the precursor to VEVRAA—the Vietnam 
Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1972 (not VEVRAA, 
which was enacted in 1974)—requiring that all contracts with 
federal agencies contain provisions requiring contractors to “give 
special emphasis to the employment of qualified disabled veterans 
and veterans of the Vietnam era.”129 Two years later, in December 
1974 during the waning months of the Vietnam War, Congress 
passed and newly inaugurated President Ford signed VEVRAA 
into law.130 VEVRAA has been amended several times since then,131 
but legislative history on references to accommodations throughout 
those amendments is sparse. Undoubtedly, this is because, inter 
alia, the statutory text defining “qualified” as “having the ability to 
perform the essential functions of the position with or without 
reasonable accommodation for an individual with a disability” did 
not become part of VEVRAA until the Jobs for Veterans Act of 
2002,132 not to mention VEVRAA’s significant overlap with the 
ADA and the Rehab Act. Witnesses at congressional hearings on 
VEVRAA occasionally cited some examples of accommodations for 
veterans with a disability that they believed were required by 
VEVRAA without listing leave as an example,133 and other 
 
 129. Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-540, 
Title V, § 503(a), 86 Stat. 1097 (1972). 
 130. Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-508, 
Title IV, § 402, 88 Stat. 1593. 
 131. Honoring America’s Veterans and Caring for Camp Lejeune Families Act of 2012, 
Pub. L. No. 112-154, Title VII, § 708, 126 Stat. 1207; Jobs for Veterans Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-288, § 2(b)(1), (2)(A)–(C), 116 Stat. 2034, 2035; Veterans Benefits and Health Care 
Improvement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-419, Title III, § 322(a), (b), 114 Stat. 1855; Veterans 
Employment Opportunities Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-339, §§ 7(a), 8, 112 Stat. 3188, 3189; 
Veterans’ Benefits Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-446, Title VII, § 702(a), 108 Stat. 
4674; Department of Veterans Affairs Codification Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-83, §§ 4(b)(8), 
5(a), (c)(1), 105 Stat. 405, 406; Veterans’ Compensation, Education, and Employment 
Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-306, Title III, § 310(a), 96 Stat. 1442; Veterans’ 
Rehabilitation and Education Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-466, Title V, § 509, Title 
VIII, § 801(j), 94 Stat. 2206, 2217; Veterans’ Administration Programs Extension Act of 1978, 
Pub. L. No. 95-520, § 6(a), 92 Stat. 1821; Veterans’ Education and Employment Assistance Act 
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-502, Title VI, §§ 605, 607(2), 90 Stat. 2405. 
 132. Jobs for Veterans Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-288, § 2(b)(1), 116 Stat. 2034. 
 133. See, e.g., Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on Education, Training and Employment of 
the Comm. on Veterans’ Affair, 97th Cong. 83–84 (handbook of the U.S. Postal Service listing 
examples of ostensibly required employee accommodations). 
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witnesses mentioned veterans getting fired for taking leave for 
doctor’s appointments134 or argued for increased training 
concerning providing accommodations to veterans with a 
disability.135 Yet, throughout the entire legislative history of 
VEVRAA and its amendments, no legislator mentions VEVRAA 
requiring leave as an accommodation. Furthermore, as was the case 
with the Rehab Act, the same Congresses that passed substantive 
amendments to VEVRAA considered, but failed to pass, at least one 
bill that would have required employee leave.136 Similarly, 
unrelated sections of VEVRAA itself provide leave rights to 
veterans called to military training and service.137 Legislative 
silence on leave as an accommodation throughout VEVRAA’s 
history provides no guidance on the issue, whereas congressional 
inaction regarding employee leave during sessions in which 
Congress considered VEVRAA and its substantive amendments 
arguably supports the conclusion that VEVRAA does not require 
leave as an accommodation at all. 
Finally, we turn to Title I of the ADA. The bill that would 
ultimately become the ADA was first drafted by the National 
Council on Disability, an independent federal agency whose 
members were appointed by President Reagan, and first introduced 
in Congress in April 1988 by Sen. Lowell Weicker and Rep. Tony 
Coelho.138 Debate over the ADA lasted for years, spanning two 
 
 134. Health Concerns of Persian Gulf Veterans: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Veterans’ 
Affairs, 103d Cong. 111 (1994) (statement of Penny Larrisey, Organizer, Operation Desert 
Shield/Storm). 
 135. See, e.g., Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Education, Training and Employment of the 
Comm. on Veterans’ Affair, 97th Cong. 118 (statement of Ronald W. Drach, National 
Employment Director, Disabled American Veterans) (“We believe that much needs to be 
done in the area of affirmative action for [qualified disabled veterans, amongst others,] and 
suggest that OPM consider the establishment of training programs for Personnel Directors 
and other staff involved in the personnel process to train them in the area of affirmative 
action[, including] reasonable accommodations to physical handicaps.”). 
 136. A bill that, inter alia, would have excluded short-term illnesses and other 
conditions from coverage under the FMLA was introduced in the 107th Congress. Family 
and Medical Leave Clarification Act, H.R. 2366, 107th Cong. (2001). This is the same Congress 
to pass the Jobs for Veterans Act, H.R. 4015, 107th Cong. (2001), section 2 of which  
amended VEVRAA when President George W. Bush signed it into law, Pub. L. No. 107-288, 
116 Stat. 2033. 
 137. Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93–508, 
Title IV, § 404, 88 Stat. 1578 (1974). 
 138. ARLENE MAYERSON, DISABILITY RTS. EDUC. & DEF. FUND, THE HISTORY OF THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (1992), https://dredf.org/about-us/publications/the-
history-of-the-ada/. 
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sessions of Congress, myriad hearings, and consideration by an 
unprecedented four House committees and one Senate committee, 
until it was finally passed by the 101st Congress—first by the Senate 
on September 9, 1989; then by the House on May 22, 1990 in a 
different form; and by both chambers in July 1990 via a Conference 
Report—and signed by President George H.W. Bush on July 26, 
1990.139 The final vote on the Conference Report was 377-28 in the 
House and 91-6 in the Senate.140 
Throughout the ADA’s long legislative history, leave is 
mentioned several times, most often in the context of leave needed 
for employees to treat HIV.141 However, the first instance of leave 
appearing in the legislative history does not occur until May 1990, 
two years after the bill was first introduced and several months 
after the Senate had first approved it. On May 15, 1990, after the 
Senate had voted on the initial bill but before the House did, the 
twenty-two majority members of the House Committee on 
Education and Labor142 delivered a report to the House 
summarizing their view that “[r]easonable accommodation may 
also include providing additional unpaid leave days, if such 
provision does not result in an undue hardship for the 
employer.”143 Of those twenty-two members, only nineteen 
ultimately voted for the bill during the roll call vote on July 12, 1990; 
two did not vote, and one could not vote.144 Two days later, in 
 
 139. Id.; Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, S. 933, 101st Cong. (enacted). 
 140. 136 CONG. REC. 17, 296–97 (1990) [hereinafter ADA Final House Vote]; id. 17,375–
76 (1990) [hereinafter ADA Final Senate Vote]. 
 141. For a recounting of the savvy politicking undertaken to include HIV and AIDS as 
disabilities within the ADA’s scope, see Lennard J. Davis’s tour de force book on the legislative 
history of the ADA, Enabling Acts: The Hidden Story of How the Americans With Disabilities Act 
Gave the Largest US Minority Its Rights (2015), especially Chapters 6 and 13. 
 142. CLERK OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 101ST CONGRESS, OFFICIAL LIST OF 
STANDING COMMITTEES & SUBCOMMITTEES FOR THE 101ST CONGRESS 14 (Sept. 5, 1990). 
[hereinafter 101st House Committee List]. Rep. Patsy Mink did not become a member of the 
committee until September 1990, which was several months after the committee’s May 1990 
report was delivered to the House. CLERK OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 101ST 
CONGRESS, OFFICIAL ANNOTATED MEMBERSHIP ROSTER BY STATE WITH VACANCY AND SPECIAL 
ELECTION INFORMATION FOR THE 101ST CONGRESS 495 (Jan. 3, 1989). 
 143. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 345. 
 144. All voting majority members of the committee voted for the bill except Reps. Ford 
and Martinez, who were not present to vote. ADA Final House Vote, supra note 140. Resident 
Commissioner Fuster could not vote on the final disposition of legislation on the floor, so he 
did not vote on the bill. See R. ERIC PETERSEN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL31856, RESIDENT 
COMMISSIONER FROM PUERTO RICO (2009), http://congressionalresearch.com/RL31856/ 
document.php. 
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debate on the House floor on May 17, 1990, before the House would 
vote on the bill five days thereafter, Rep. Theodore S. Weiss (who 
would also ultimately vote for the bill) opined that the ADA would 
“ensure that persons with HIV have the right to flexible hours and 
time off that are crucial to help accommodate the disease.”145 
After the House passed a bill on May 22, 1990, differing from 
the one that the Senate had passed the prior fall, twenty-one House 
managers submitted a Conference Report to the House on July 12, 
1990, within which they advised that 
if an individual has an infectious disease that can be eliminated 
by taking medication for a specified period of time, the employer 
must offer the employee the reasonable accommodation of 
allowing the individual time off to take such medication. Of 
course, this accommodation would be subject to the same “undue 
hardship” limitation which applies to all accommodations under 
this title.146 
Ultimately, twenty of those twenty-one managers would vote 
for the bill, with one abstaining.147 Of the twenty, only three were 
also majority members of the House Committee on Education and 
Labor, and all of them voted for the bill.148 Several representatives 
spoke on the floor of the House on behalf of the Conference Report 
on the day that it was submitted: Reps. Major R. Owens and Henry 
Waxman professed that “the bill will be particularly important  
in ensuring that people with HIV disease have the right to  
flexible work schedules and to time off to accommodate their 
treatment needs or their various disease-related conditions,” Rep. 
Don. Edwards cited “allowing the employee time off to recover 
from [a contagious] disease” as an example of a “reasonable 
accommodation,” and Rep. Howard Berman restated the 
Conference Report’s text concerning time off.149 
 
 145. 136 CONG. REC. 10,872 (1990); see also ADA Final House Vote, supra note 140 
(showing Rep. Weiss’s vote). 
 146. H.R. REP. NO. 101-596, at 67–68; 136 CONG. REC. 17,268 (1990). 
 147. ADA Final House Vote, supra note 140. Rep. Martinez did not vote. Id. 
 148. Id.; 101st House Committee List, supra note 142. 
 149. 136 CONG. REC. 17,289 (1990) (statement of Rep. Owens); id. at 17,290 (multiple 
statements of Rep. Edwards); id. at 17,293 (statement of Rep. Waxman); id. at 17,294 
(statement of Rep. Berman). Reps. Owens and Edwards already signaled their support for 
leave as an accommodation by signing on to the Conference Report itself, but Reps. Waxman 
and Berman, both of whom voted for the final bill, ADA Final House Vote, supra note 140, 
add new names to the list of representatives supporting leave as an accommodation at least 
some of the time. 
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On the following day, the ten Senate managers submitted the 
Conference Report to the Senate, after which one of the managers, 
Sen. Ted Kennedy, cited “allowing [an] employee time off to 
recover from [a] disease” as an example of a “reasonable 
accommodation,” and went on to say that “the reasonable 
accommodation provision of the bill will be particularly important 
in ensuring that people with HIV disease have the right to flexible 
work schedules and to time off to accommodate their treatment 
needs or their various disease-related conditions.”150 All ten of 
those managers voted for the final bill.151 
In sum, the ADA’s legislative history demonstrates that at least 
39 House members of the 377 who voted for the ADA,152 as well as 
at least 10 Senate members of the 91 who voted for the ADA, 
supported leave as an accommodation at least some of the time. 
Such sentiment comports with the ADA’s text and tracks the 
regulations later promulgated by the EEOC stating that leave can 
be an accommodation at least some of the time without clarifying 
when. Moreover, although this legislative history fails to evidence 
a majority of support for leave as an accommodation in either 
chamber, it is telling that the statements in support of leave were 
made on the floor of both chambers, in a key committee report, and 
in both Conference Reports, all of which were publicly available  
to the House and Senate members before their final votes. 
Significantly, not a single legislator opined that leave can never be 
an accommodation. Looking at this legislative history of the ADA 
suggests, but certainly does not make clear, that leave can be an 
accommodation at least some of the time. 
However, it is worth looking outside the context of the ADA for 
contradictory evidence, as there was far more debate over 
employee leave throughout the halls of the 101st Congress beyond 
the confines of the ADA—that is, debate about the recently 
proposed FMLA.153 That session, both houses of Congress passed 
the FMLA, which would have required employee leave in certain 
 
 150. 136 CONG. REC. 17,377 (1990). 
 151. H.R. REP. NO. 101-596, at 71–72 (listing the ten Senate managers); ADA Senate 
House Vote, supra note 140 (showing their votes). 
 152. The sum of the nineteen members of the House Committee on Education and 
Labor; the seventeen discrete House managers of the Conference Report; and Reps. Weiss, 
Waxman, and Burman is thirty-nine. 
 153. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 102-135, pt. 1 (1991). 
1529 Now and Again 
 1529 
situations, but it was vetoed by President George H.W. Bush.154 
Amid intense debate over employee leave during the very same 
congressional session in which the ADA passed, one could argue 
that, had Congress meant the ADA to require leave as 
accommodation, it probably would have said so explicitly. But it 
did not. In fact, in an extension of remarks not read on the floor, 
Rep. Larry Craig cited the ADA’s obligations on employers as 
wholly distinct from the “medical leave” obligations that the FMLA 
would have imposed on employers had it passed that session,155 
potentially implying an understanding within Congress at the  
time that the ADA did not impose leave obligations on employers 
at all. Yet, if we must synthesize legislative history, neither the  
lack of more robust debate over leave during passage of the  
ADA nor Rep. Craig’s implication that it may not require “medical 
leave” are as persuasive as the multiple statements of support for  
leave as an accommodation from dozens of members of both 
houses of Congress. 
Finally, the section of the ADA defining “qualified individual” 
as one who “can perform” the job (and, indeed, all of Title I of the 
ADA) has been amended twice, first by the Civil Rights Act of 
1991156 and second by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008.157 
However, nowhere in the voluminous legislative history of either 
of these acts are leaves as an accommodation explicitly mentioned 
by any members of Congress. At best, at a hearing on the ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008 before the House Judiciary Committee on 
September 13, 2006, an interested organization, the Consortium for 
Citizens with Disabilities (CCD), told the committee about two 
instances of disability leave accommodations that were denied by 
courts, the first when the employee had mitigated her disability and 
the second because the disability allegedly did not substantially 
limit major life activities.158 Both of these complaints went to the 
heart of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008—expanding the scope 
of “disability” under the ADA.159 Presumably, if the committee 
members or the CCD were concerned that leave should not have 
 
 154. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1990, H.R. 770, 101st Cong. 
 155. 136 CONG. REC. E1774-02, E1774 (1990). 
 156. Civil Right Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1077. 
 157. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 5(c)(1), 122 Stat. 3553, 3557. 
 158. Americans with Disabilities Act: Sixteen Years Later: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
the Const. of the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R., 109th Cong. 915–16, 917–18 (2006). 
 159. See ADA Amendments Act § 2. 
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been an accommodation in those circumstances, someone would 
have said so, suggesting a widespread agreement that leave can be 
an accommodation at least some of the time. Yet, drawing 
conclusions from such silence is tenuous and unnecessary. 
In sum, the review of legislative history provides limited, but 
reasonable, support for the text-and-regulation-based conclusion 
vis-à-vis Title I of the ADA that leave probably can be an 
accommodation at least some of the time, although the legislative 
history fails to provide the sort of nuanced support necessary to 
clarify which sorts of leave are permissible. Finally, the silence of 
legislative history concerning leave as an accommodation under 
the Rehab Act and VEVRAA is unhelpful, leaving us only with 
alternative sources like statutory text and agency guidance. 
C. Extrinsic Interpretations 
Having exhausted a capacious, albeit hermetic, analysis of  
the laws regulating leave as an accommodation in sections I.A–B,  
this section considers guidance from courts and scholars. Herein,  
I review interpretations of disability leave as an accommodation 
generally, as well as accommodating disability leave when the 
employee cannot work, disability leave that thwarts the 
predictability of business operations for employers, and long-term 
disability leave. 
Although the Supreme Court has never considered leave as an 
accommodation under any of the federal disability accommodation 
laws, all but one circuit court with relevant jurisdiction has held 
that leave may be an accommodation at least some of the time.160 
 
 160. Delaval v. PTech Drilling Tubulars, LLC, 824 F.3d 476, 481 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Time 
off . . . can be a reasonable accommodation . . . .”); Wilson v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 717 F.3d 337, 
345 n.7 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[A] leave request will not be unreasonable on its face so long as  
it [meets several requirements] . . . .”); Santandreu v. Miami Dade Cnty., 513 F. App’x 902, 
905 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[A] leave of absence may be a reasonable accommodation . . . .”);  
Brannon v. Luco Mop Co., 521 F.3d 843, 849 (8th Cir. 2008) (“[A]llowing a medical leave of 
absence might, in some circumstances, be a reasonable accommodation . . . .”); Taylor v. Rice, 
451 F.3d 898, 910 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“An employee’s proposed accommodation seeking to use 
leave time to receive necessary medical care will be reasonable in many circumstances.”); 
Fogleman v. Greater Hazleton Health All., 122 F. App’x 581, 585 (3d Cir. 2004) (“In some 
instances, it may be possible for a requested leave of absence to constitute a reasonable 
accommodation.”); Humphrey v. Mem’l Hosps. Ass’n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001)  
(“A leave of absence for medical treatment may be a reasonable accommodation under the 
ADA.”); García-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 650 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(“[R]etaining the ailing employee’s slot while granting unsalaried leave may be a reasonable 
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To date, only the Second Circuit is silent on leave as an 
accommodation,161 although nearly all of the district courts within 
that circuit concur with the majority of circuits.162 Indeed, other 
than the U.S. District Court for the District of Vermont, which has 
yet to consider the issue, the country is on the same page in 
concluding that leave may be an accommodation at least some of 
the time. Courts have analyzed section 501 of the Rehab Act in a 
materially identical manner, although fewer courts have done so.163 
Finally, neither courts nor administrative law judges have 
considered section 503 of the Rehab Act or VEVRAA in the context 
of leave as an accommodation, most likely because there is no 
 
accommodation required by the ADA.”); Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio Alzheimer’s Rsch. Ctr., 155 F.3d 
775, 783 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[A] medical leave of absence can constitute a reasonable 
accommodation under appropriate circumstances.”); Haschmann v. Time Warner Ent. Co., 
151 F.3d 591, 601 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[T]here was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable 
juror could conclude that the second medical leave, as requested, would have been a 
reasonable accommodation.”); Hudson v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 87 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th 
Cir. 1996) (“[A] reasonable allowance of time for medical care and treatment may, in 
appropriate circumstances, constitute a reasonable accommodation.”). 
 161. Wenc v. New London Bd. of Educ., 702 F. App’x 27, 30 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[W]e have 
not squarely addressed in a published opinion when a medical leave may constitute a 
‘reasonable accommodation’ under the ADA . . . .”). 
 162. Forgione v. City of New York, No. 11-CV-5248, 2012 WL 4049832, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 13, 2012) (“[A] request for leave may constitute a reasonable accommodation in certain 
circumstances . . . .”); Graves v. Finch Pruyn & Co., No. 103-CV-266 (GLS/RFT), 2009 WL 
819380, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2009) (stating that a request for leave “may constitute a 
reasonable accommodation”), aff’d on other grounds, 353 F. App’x 558 (2d Cir. 2009); Cousins 
v. Howell Corp., 113 F. Supp. 2d 262, 271 (D. Conn. 2000); Karn v. Williams Advanced 
Materials, No. 02-CV-0852E(F), 2005 WL 1397014, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. June 13, 2005) (holding 
that “a short leave of absence” may be a reasonable accommodation); Powers v. Polygram 
Holding, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 2d 195, 201–02 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“[T]he ADA contemplates leaves 
of absence as a possible reasonable accommodation under the ADA.”). 
 163. Fuller v. Frank, 916 F.2d 558, 562 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding the agency “reasonably 
accommodated” an employee’s disability under the Rehab Act by allowing leave);  
Rodgers v. Lehman, 869 F.2d 253, 259 (4th Cir. 1989) (explaining that federal agencies must, 
before firing an employee with a disability, “afford him [or her] an opportunity to participate 
in an inpatient program, using accrued or unpaid leave, unless the agency can establish that 
it would suffer an undue hardship from the employee’s absence”); Nandori v. City of 
Bridgeport, No. 3:12CV673 JBA, 2014 WL 186430, at *5 (D. Conn. Jan. 16, 2014) (“‘[M]edical 
leave may be a reasonable accommodation under the [Rehabilitation Act].’”); Johnson v. 
Sullivan, 824 F. Supp. 1146, 1156 (D. Md. 1991) (stating that “leave to attend to medical 
problems” is an accommodation under the Rehab Act), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. 
Johnson v. Shalala, 991 F.2d 126 (4th Cir. 1993); Whitlock v. Donovan, 598 F. Supp. 126, 137 
(D.D.C. 1984) (“[T]he reasonable accommodation duty [imposed by the Rehab Act] requires 
the agency to evaluate whether . . . leave . . . would have imposed an undue hardship on the 
agency.”), aff’d sub nom. Whitlock v. Brock, 790 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
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private right of action under either statute164 and because they 
largely overlap with other statutes like the ADA. 
A handful of decisions interpreting the Rehab Act as requiring 
leaves as accommodations in some situations predate the 
enactment of the ADA,165 potentially suggesting that these earlier 
decisions were ratified and incorporated by the legislators behind 
the ADA. If true, then perhaps the ADA definitively requires leave 
as an accommodation at least some of the time. After all, Title I of 
the ADA directs agencies with enforcement authority over the 
statutes to “prevent[] [the] imposition of inconsistent or conflicting 
standards for the same requirements under [Title I of the ADA]  
and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,”166 suggesting that the ADA 
intended to substantively copy-and-paste the extant law of the 
Rehab Act into a large swath of the private sector. Yet, if we are to 
rely on legislative intent to shape the meaning of the ADA, it speaks 
great volumes that Congress failed to cite either of these earlier 
Rehab Act cases in debate over the ADA, and the cases never 
received significant press. Thus, there is no evidence that Congress 
considered these cases, let alone ratified or incorporated them, 
when passing the ADA. 
Proceeding to the heart of the matter, we next turn to how 
courts assess the central thesis of this Article. Foremost, courts are 
split on whether the law requires accommodating employees with 
reasonable leave that imposes no undue hardship when they 
cannot work presently. Courts run the gamut from rightly 
excluding such employees as unqualified for the right reason, 
righty excluding such employees as unqualified for the wrong 
reason, and mistakenly including such employees as qualified. 
Starting with an example of a court to reach the correct holding for 
the correct reason, in an Eighth Circuit opinion written by Judge C. 
Arlen Beam, the court cites the ADA’s definition of “qualified 
individual” before holding that “it is axiomatic that in order for [an 
employee with a disability] to show that she could perform the 
essential functions of her job, she must show that she is at least able 
to show up for work.”167 Applying that apt construction of the ADA 
 
 164. Riley v. Outlook Neb., Inc., No. 8:12CV168, 2013 WL 12123508, at *2 (D. Neb. Feb. 
4, 2013) (collecting cases); Douris v. Bucks Cnty. Off. of Dist. Att’y, No. CIV.A.04-CV-232, 
2005 WL 226151, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2005) (collecting cases). 
 165. See, e.g., Rodgers, 869 F.2d at 259; Whitlock, 598 F. Supp. at 137. 
 166. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(b). 
 167. Browning v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 178 F.3d 1043, 1048 (8th Cir. 1999). 
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to the facts at bar, Judge Beam noted that the plaintiff, a claims 
representative who was recovering from surgery and dealing with 
the emotional struggle of having to do so, was “unable to report to 
work” due to her physical and, at times, mental incapacity, 
rendering her unqualified for an accommodation.168 Judge Beam’s 
opinion is emblematic of an ideal analysis. 
In a similar vein, in a Fifth Circuit opinion penned by Judge 
Edith H. Jones, the court cited the same statutory provision before 
holding that “[b]ecause [a mechanic recuperating from ankle 
surgery] could not attend work, he is not a ‘qualified individual 
with a disability’ under the ADA.”169 Had that concluded the 
matter, Judge Jones’s opinion would have been as ideal as that of 
Judge Beam’s. Yet, the opinion went on to (1) argue that attendance 
is an essential function of the job (which, as I explained, supra, is an 
unnecessary thicket to navigate), and (2) cite with approval a 
Fourth Circuit case concluding that an employee “who does not 
come to work cannot perform any of his job functions, essential or 
otherwise.”170 Not true. Employees B and D did not come to work, 
but they could have performed the functions of the job if they had 
wanted to, meaning they were qualified. 
In an unrelated Fourth Circuit opinion, Judge J. Harvie 
Wilkinson III remarked of Title I of the ADA and its regulations: 
Significantly, these provisions contain no reference to an 
individual’s future ability to perform the essential functions of  
his position. To the contrary, they are formulated entirely in  
the present tense, framing the precise issue as whether an 
individual “can” (not “will be able to”) perform the job with 
reasonable accommodation.171 
True enough. However, in that case, the panel denied the 
requested accommodation (i.e., indefinite leave) only on 
unreasonableness grounds without commenting on whether it was 
also indefensible because the employee was unable to do his job 
and, thus, unqualified.172 In a recent Sixth Circuit decision by Judge 
Ronald Lee Gilman, the panel likewise sidestepped the issue of 
whether and when disability leave as an accommodation renders 
 
 168. Id. at 1047–49 (emphasis added). 
 169. Rogers v. Int’l Marine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755, 757, 759 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 170. Id. at 759 (quoting Tyndall v. Nat’l Educ. Ctrs., Inc., 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1994)). 
 171. Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 1995). 
 172. Id. 
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employees unqualified, instead resting its holding entirely on 
indefinite leave being unreasonable.173 
As a brief tangent, while the DOL’s regulations implementing 
the FMLA explicitly list “intermittent leave” as permissible,174 
neither the federal disability accommodation statutes nor the 
regulations that implement them provide any clarity on 
intermittent leave. As such, courts have split over the 
reasonableness of disability leaves that fail to provide employers 
sufficient certainty vis-à-vis when their employees can work (e.g., 
leaves that may be called intermittent, indefinite, irregular, 
reoccurring, sporadic, erratic, frequent, and/or unpredictable).175 
As an example, the Tenth Circuit has concluded that “the ADA 
does not require an employer to grant an employee indefinite leave 
as an accommodation” because indefinite leave is unreasonable.176 
On the other hand, representing the minority view, the First Circuit 
has concluded that indefinite leave can be reasonable in certain 
situations, so employers can deny such accommodations only if 
they impose an undue hardship on this particular set of facts.177 
Respectfully, these analyses jump the gun. Instead of first 
considering whether the employees requesting indefinite leave are 
qualified under the relevant statutory texts, these courts focus on 
the reasonableness and/or the undue hardship of such leave, both 
of which may be mooted by the unqualified inquiry. 
Where some, like Judge Beam, rightly analyze whether 
employees requesting disability leave are qualified, other judges 
have muddied the waters with analyses that reach the right result 
for the wrong reason. For instance, Judge Frank Easterbrook, 
writing for a panel of the Seventh Circuit in considering leave as an 
accommodation for a night-shift engineer with depression that 
caused hallucinations, panic attacks, and suicidal ideation, held: 
 
 173. Williams v. AT&T Mobility Servs. LLC, 847 F.3d 384, 394–95 (6th Cir. 2017). 
 174. 29 C.F.R. § 825.202(a) (2021). 
 175. EEOC Performance and Conduct Standards, supra note 24, at n.76 (collecting 
agency interpretations and cases discussing whether indefinite leave requests are 
unreasonable and/or undue hardships). 
 176. Hudson v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 87 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Myers, 
50 F.3d at 283); see also Stacy A. Hickox & Joseph M. Guzman, Leave as an Accommodation: 
When Is Enough, Enough?, 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 437, 457–63 (2014). 
 177. García-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 648–50 (1st Cir. 2000); see 
also Romanello v. Intesa Sanpaolo, S.p.A., 22 N.Y.3d 881, 885 (2013) (reaching a similar 
conclusion under New York City’s municipal analog to the ADA). 
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The sort of accommodation contemplated by the [ADA] is one 
that will allow the person to “perform the essential functions of 
the employment position”. Not working is not a means to perform 
the job’s essential functions. An inability to do the job’s essential 
tasks means that one is not “qualified”; it does not mean that the 
employer must excuse the inability.178 
Here, Judge Easterbrook distorts the text of the ADA. He claims 
that the ADA permits only those accommodations that allow  
an employee to perform the job presently. In reality, the ADA 
permits accommodations only when an employee can do their job. 
The subtle distinction between these propositions is best 
elucidated, unsurprisingly, by a leave of absence. When one takes 
leave voluntarily, one can perform the job presently even if the 
employee is not doing so. “Can perform” and “will perform” mean 
different things. 
Judge Easterbrook goes on to write that an “[i]nability to work 
for a multi-month period removes a person from the class protected 
by the ADA” because such person is not a “qualified individual.”179 
While it appears that the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion reached the 
correct result in that the employee here suffered from 
incapacitating depression and, hence, likely could not do the job at 
the start of his leave, the panel’s reasoning regrettably relies not on 
the employee being unqualified when his leave would have started, 
but instead on the length of that leave rendering him unqualified. 
The Seventh Circuit has repeated this faulty construction of the 
ADA in a few additional cases, most recently in one opinion, 
Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc., which not only garnered 
significant press but was also considered on petition for certiorari 
by the Supreme Court; that petition was denied.180 In that case, 
 
 178. Byrne v. Avon Prods., Inc., 328 F.3d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc., 872 F.3d 476, 479 (7th Cir. 2017) (reasoning 
that an employee whose disability necessitates a “long-term medical leave cannot work and 
thus is not a ‘qualified individual’ under the ADA”), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1441 (2018);  
see also Basden v. Pro. Transp., Inc., 714 F.3d 1034, 1037 (7th Cir. 2013) (“A plaintiff  
whose disability prevents her from coming to work regularly cannot perform the essential 
functions of her job, and thus cannot be a qualified individual for ADA purposes.”). For 
sample press on Severson, see Case Comment, Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc.:  
Seventh Circuit Rules That a Multimonth Leave of Absence Cannot Be a Reasonable Accommodation, 
131 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2018); Tracie DeFreitas, Long-Term Leave and the ADA After  
Severson, JOB ACCOMMODATION NETWORK, https://askjan.org/articles/Long-Term- 
Leave-and-the-ADA-after-Severson.cfm (last visited Mar. 11, 2021); David J. Rowland &  
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which was also written by Judge Easterbrook, the court declared 
the ADA to be “an antidiscrimination statute, not a medical-leave 
entitlement.”181 Respectfully, this rather provocative language 
lacks any mooring in the text of the ADA or its legislative history, 
as I demonstrated in sections I.A–B, supra. Nothing about the 
statutory text or legislative history of the ADA says “leaves not 
required” in the same way that the most famous antidiscrimination 
statute in American history, Title VII, also carries with it a leave 
entitlement, as construed by the Supreme Court.182 
In a vein similar to that of Judge Easterbrook, then-Judge Neil 
Gorsuch, writing for the Tenth Circuit, wrote that “reasonable 
accommodations . . . are all about enabling employees to work, not 
to not work” before holding that lengthy leaves as accommodations 
(six months, in the case at bar) are both unreasonable and render 
the employee unqualified.183 This opinion is of particular interest 
given that its author now sits on the Supreme Court, thus giving us 
a glimpse into how the Court might view disability leaves as 
accommodations. Unfortunately, then-Judge Gorsuch makes one of 
the same mistakes as Judge Easterbrook by hinging the ADA’s 
“qualified individual” inquiry on the length of the leave and not on 
whether the employee can work at the start of that leave. 
Similarly, Judge George A. O’Toole, Jr., a district court judge 
sitting by designation on a First Circuit panel, writing in a dissent 
in another case, claimed that leave as an accommodation, ipso  
facto, harbors an “oxymoronic anomaly”—viz., granting an 
accommodation not to work to an employee who must be able to 
work.184 “It cannot be overlooked,” Judge O’Toole argued, “that the 
statute speaks in the present tense, indicative mood. A ‘qualified 
individual with a disability’ entitled to the statute’s protection is a 
person who ‘can perform the essential functions of the employment 
position’ with reasonable accommodation. ‘Can perform,’ as in 
‘now.’”185 Yet, Judge O’Toole confuses the analysis by stating that 
 
Cheryl A. Luce, A Shocker from the Heartland: A Long Term Leave of Absence Is NOT a  
Reasonable Accommodation Under the ADA, EMP. L. LOOKOUT (Sept. 25, 2017), 
https://www.laborandemploymentlawcounsel.com/2017/09/a-shocker-from-the-heartland- 
a-long-term-leave-of-absence-is-not-a-reasonable-accommodation-under-the-ada/. 
 181. Severson, 872 F.3d at 479. 
 182. See infra note 203 and accompanying text. 
 183. Hwang v. Kan. State Univ., 753 F.3d 1159, 1162 (10th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). 
 184. García-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 651–52 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(O’Toole, J., dissenting). 
 185. Id. at 655 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)) (emphasis omitted). 
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employers must accommodate employees with disability leave 
only if the length of that leave is “tolerably consistent with the 
statutory words, ‘can perform,’” from which one can only imply 
that brief leaves can be accommodations whereas longer leaves 
cannot.186 Judge O’Toole also missteps by describing 
accommodating disability leave as an “oxymoron” because he 
clearly believes that the statute, if read literally in a manner that  
he describes as “cramped and unrealistic,” entirely excludes  
disability leaves as accommodations.187 Not so. Employees who 
take voluntary disability leave are “qualified” for leave as an 
accommodation because they can opt not to. 
Finally, emblematic of a court reaching the wrong conclusion 
by including employees as qualified when they are requesting 
involuntary leaves is a Ninth Circuit opinion written by Judge 
David R. Thompson. That case dealt with a sales associate who 
physically could not work at the start of her leave or during its 
pendency due to “a fainting disorder that caused episodes during 
which she lost consciousness,” but the court deemed her not to be 
an “unqualified individual” on that basis, reasoning that “her 
inability to work during the leave period would not automatically 
render her unqualified.”188 Although the panel is technically correct 
that inability to work during a leave does not render one 
unqualified, as was the case for employee B who became unable to 
work during her leave, the sales associate here was also unable to 
perform the essential functions of her job when leave began. That 
is the end of the matter. On that basis alone, she should have been 
deemed unqualified for leave as an accommodation, but the court 
reasoned otherwise. In effect, the Ninth Circuit here was focused 
only on the ability of the employee to work again, not the ability to 
work now. 
Likely in an attempt to circumvent the ADA’s purported 
“oxymoronic anomaly,” courts have invented new standards that 
are highly practical but divorced from the statutory text: an 
employee requesting leave is “qualified” if the employee can 
perform the essential functions of the job presently or will be able 
to perform those functions “upon [the employee’s] return”189 or in 
 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1245, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 189. Humphrey v. Mem’l Hosps. Ass’n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001); accord 
Nunes, 164 F.3d at 1247. 
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the “near”190 or “immediate”191 future. Had Congress meant to 
include employees who cannot work now but will be able to do the 
job at some point in the future—or, I should say, probably will, or 
may, be able to do the job, since neither employers nor their 
employees have crystal balls that predict whether the employee 
will be able to work at some undefined future time—in the 
definition of “qualified individual” in the disability 
accommodation statutes, it would have done so. It did not. Title I 
of the ADA, sections 501 and 503 of the Rehab Act, and VEVRAA 
leave no room for any alternative interpretation; employees who 
cannot work now are not qualified for leave or any other 
accommodations under the text of those statutes. 
Scholars and practitioners tend to conclude that leave can be an 
accommodation at least some of the time without expounding upon 
when, if ever, an employee’s inability to work would render that 
employee unqualified,192 although some have called out, as Judge 
O’Toole did, the supposed “counterintuitive” nature of providing 
leave as an accommodation to a putatively unqualified 
employee.193 Some scholars maintain that leave must be an 
 
 190. Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 151 (3d Cir. 2004), modified 
on other grounds by Erdman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 500 (3d Cir. 2009); Hudson v. 
MCI Telecomms. Corp., 87 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 191. Wood v. Green, 323 F.3d 1309, 1314 (11th Cir. 2003); Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 
283 (4th Cir. 1995). 
 192. See Lawrence P. Postol, ADA Open Issues: Transfers to Vacant Positions, Leaves of 
Absence, Telecommuting, and Other Accommodation Issues, 8 ELON L. REV. 61, 75 (2016) (“[S]hort, 
unpaid leaves of absence are a required reasonable accommodation under the ADA.”); Ann 
C. Hodges, Working with Cancer: How the Law Can Help Survivors Maintain Employment,  
90 WASH. L. REV. 1039, 1078–85 (2015); Nicole Buonocore Porter, The New ADA Backlash,  
82 TENN. L. REV. 1, 73 (2014) (“Generally, leaves of absence are a reasonable form of 
accommodation . . . .”); Megan G. Rosenberger, Absenteeism and the ADA: The Limits and the 
Loopholes, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 957, 964 (2001) (“[I]ndividuals with chronic illnesses that 
require sporadic or extended periods of time off may be covered by the ADA.”); Laura F. 
Rothstein, The Employer’s Duty to Accommodate Performance and Conduct Deficiencies of 
Individuals with Mental Impairments Under Disability Discrimination Laws, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
931, 960 (1997) (“[L]eave time for rehabilitation is an accommodation that should be 
considered as a possible reasonable accommodation . . . .”); but see Passamano, supra note 77, 
at 894 (“[L]eave is effectively not available as a reasonable accommodation under the ADA” 
because “the employer is under no obligation to accommodate” an employee with leave 
because “regular and predictable attendance is[,] as a matter of law[,] an essential function 
of practically all employment.”). 
 193. See, e.g., EEOC Issues New Guidance on Leave and the ADA, PAYROLL MANAGER’S 
LETTER, July 2016, at 6 (2016) (“To be protected by the ADA, an employee must show that he 
or she is able to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable 
accommodation. And it would seem that an essential function of any job is the ability to show 
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accommodation, at least in part, because they contend that a “literal 
reading” of the ADA would be “unreasonably narrow and 
impractical” as such a reading, ostensibly, would require an 
accommodation to be “effective immediately in terms of enabling 
an employee to perform the essential functions of the job.”194 With 
respect, this analysis tracks Judge O’Toole’s misconstruction of the 
statutory text and is mistaken for the reasons outlined above. 
As a concluding note, the title of this Article is imbued with 
irony. Idiomatically, “now and again” means “occasionally” or 
“every once in a while,”195 whereas the literal meaning of “now and 
again” is “presently and at some time in the future.” This 
dichotomy bares a strikingly similarity to the attitude with which 
most stakeholders view the statutory requirement that an employee 
be able to perform the essential functions of the job to qualify for an 
accommodation on one hand and my reconceived analytic on the 
other. To put it another way, the conventional approach to 
disability leave as an accommodation is to the idiomatic meaning 
of “now and again” as this Article’s thesis is to its literal meaning. 
While the conventional approach dictates disability leave as an 
accommodation so long as, inter alia, the employee can work 
occasionally, every once in a while, in the immediate or near future, 
or some other likeminded, practical standard (i.e., the idiomatic 
“now and again”), this Article argues that an employee qualifies for 
disability leave as an accommodation only if, inter alia, the 
employee can work, quite literally, now and again. 
II. MAKING IT ALL WORK 
Part II argues that federal disability accommodation law 
excludes employees needing involuntary leaves as unqualified for 
such accommodations. This Part assumes arguendo the correctness 
of that thesis. If we assume the correctness of my argument, can we 
implement it in such a way that practically makes sense within the 
overall corpus of federal law? To that end, I first consider why 
federal law always requires leave as an accommodation for 
 
up for work. Nonetheless, while it may seem counterintuitive, the [EEOC] and many courts 
take the position that time off from the job may be a required reasonable accommodation.”). 
 194. Stephen F. Befort, The Most Difficult ADA Reasonable Accommodation Issues: 
Reassignment and Leave of Absence, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 439, 459 (2002) (citing García-Ayala 
v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 655 (1st Cir. 2000) (O’Toole, J., dissenting)). 
 195. Every now and then, CHRISTINE AMMER, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF 
IDIOMS: AMERICAN ENGLISH IDIOMATIC EXPRESSIONS & PHRASES (2d rev. ed. 2013). 
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religious practices and beliefs, so long as leave is reasonable and 
imposes no undue hardship, whereas I contend that federal law 
only sometimes requires such disability leaves as an 
accommodation (i.e., when the employee can work now). Second,  
I consider provisions of the disability accommodation laws stating 
that part-time and modified work schedules are permissible 
accommodations, asking how those provisions can be read in 
concert with the imperative that employees be able to work now to 
qualify for leave as an accommodation. In both cases, the theme of 
this Part is to discern whether we can harmonize federal law given 
Part II’s reconceptualization of the preconditions for disability 
leave as an accommodation. I argue that we can. 
A. Leave for Religious Practices and Beliefs 
This section considers the only other federal employee 
accommodation statute (i.e., Title VII)196 to glean why it appears, at 
least on the surface, dissimilar to Title I of the ADA vis-à-vis leave 
entitlements. Inter alia, section 703 of Title VII bars covered entities 
like employers with fifteen or more employees, employment 
agencies, and labor organizations from discriminating against 
employees based on “religion,”197 which “includes all aspects of 
religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an 
employer demonstrates that he [sic] is unable to reasonably 
accommodate to an employee’s . . . religious observance or practice 
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s 
business.”198 Though the EEOC lacks congressional authority to 
promulgate regulations implementing Title VII that carry the  
force of law,199 it has issued interpretive guidance concerning  
 
 196. Federal law imposes no other affirmative accommodation obligations on 
employers unless they discriminate on impermissible grounds in accommodating some 
employees and not others. For example, there is no affirmative obligation to accommodate 
employees’ pregnancies. Young v. UPS, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1344 (2015); Bradley A. Areheart, 
Accommodating Pregnancy, 67 ALA. L. REV. 1125, 1133–39 (2016). This Article does not consider 
antidiscrimination law. 
 197. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. 
 198. Id. § 2000e(j). 
 199. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257–59 (1991), superseded by statute on 
other grounds as stated in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 512 n.8 (2006); Gen. Elec. Co. 
v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976) (“Congress, in enacting Title VII, did not confer upon the 
EEOC authority to promulgate rules or regulations pursuant to that Title.”), superseded by 
statute on other grounds, Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 995,  
92 Stat. 2076 (1978). 
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religious accommodations that appears in the Code of Federal 
Regulations.200 While these guidelines mention accommodations 
because of “religious practices [that] conflict with [employees’] 
work schedules,”201 leave is not explicitly mentioned as a 
permissible accommodation under Title VII. Rather, the first 
explicit mention of leave as an accommodation appears in the 
EEOC’s subregulatory guidance.202 Relying on the text of Title VII 
and not any iterations of the EEOC’s guidance, in Ansonia Board of 
Education v. Philbrook, the Supreme Court held that reasonable 
leaves are accommodations under Title VII so long as they impose 
no undue hardship.203 
Much like section 503 of the Rehab Act and VEVRAA, Executive 
Order 11,246 requires federal contracts and subcontracts to contain 
a provision wherein the private contracting entity agrees “not [to] 
discriminate against any employee . . . because of . . . religion. . . .”204 
The OFCCP, which is the sole agency to administer Executive 
Order 11, 246,205 has promulgated regulations implementing that 
order requiring employers to “accommodate to the religious 
observances and practices of an employee . . . unless the employer 
demonstrates that it is unable to reasonably accommodate to an 
 
 200. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2 (2021); see also EEOC v. Ithaca Indus., Inc., 829 F.2d 519, 522 (4th 
Cir. 1987), rev’d on other grounds on reh’g en banc, 849 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1988); EEOC v. E.I. 
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 623 F. Supp. 15, 17 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (“Unlike regulations issued 
by federal agencies, EEOC interpretative guidelines do not have the force of law because 
they are promulgated pursuant to statutory authority or according to the rulemaking process 
dictated by the EEOC Administrative Procedure Act. Though they are often entitled to a 
strong degree of deference, the interpretative guidelines are not dispositive of Title VII issues 
and not binding upon courts, as are federal regulations.”) (citations omitted). 
 201. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(d)(1). 
 202. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC-NVTA-0000-20, WHAT YOU SHOULD 
KNOW: WORKPLACE RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION (2014) (“Examples of common religious 
accommodations include . . . an adherent to Native American spiritual beliefs needs unpaid 
leave to attend a ritual ceremony . . . .”); Religious Discrimination, EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/religion.cfm (last visited Mar. 15, 2021) 
(“Unless it would be an undue hardship on the employer’s operation of its business, an 
employer must reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs or practices. This 
applies . . . to . . . leave for religious observances . . . .”). 
 203. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70 (1986) (“[The employer’s policy], 
requiring [the plaintiff-employee] to take unpaid leave for holy day observance that 
exceeded the amount allowed by the collective-bargaining agreement, would generally be a 
reasonable one.”); id. at 74 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[U]npaid 
leave will generally amount to a reasonable accommodation . . . .”) (emphasis omitted). 
 204. Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 202(1), 3 C.F.R. § 339 (1964–1965), reprinted as amended in 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 
 205. OFCCP, Jurisdiction Thresholds, supra note 39. 
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employee’s . . . religious observance or practice without undue 
hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”206 However, 
no court or administrative law judge has considered Executive 
Order 11,246 in the context of leave as an accommodation, most 
likely because, inter alia, “virtually every federal court to consider 
the issue has held that Executive Order 11[,]246 does not provide a 
private right of action.”207 Regardless, there is no material 
distinction between Executive Order 11,246 and Title VII vis-à-vis 
leave as an accommodation, so any judge to consider the issue 
would certainly hold as the Court did in Philbrook by finding that 
leave is an accommodation for religious practices and beliefs when 
reasonable and imposing no undue burden on the employer.  
Note the difference between Title VII and Executive Order 
11,246 on one hand and the federal disability accommodation 
statutes on the other. Title VII and Executive Order 11,246 do not 
limit accommodations to “qualified” employees in the way that 
Title I of the ADA, sections 501 and 503 of the Rehab Act, and 
VEVRAA do. Accordingly, there are no phrases like “can perform,” 
“has the ability to perform,” or “having the ability to perform” that 
exclude employees who cannot presently work from leave as an 
accommodation. In that way, I contend that these laws are, 
textually and theoretically, distinct. Yet, I simply cannot imagine or 
locate a case of an involuntary religious leave that would concretize 
that distinction in practice. By involuntary religious leave, I mean 
leave to accommodate to an employee’s religious observance or 
practice wherein the leave must be taken without any warning and, 
at the start of which, the employee is physically, emotionally, or 
mentally incapable of doing the job. The closest that I can come is 
an employee who suddenly sees the light, like Saul knocked to the 
ground en route to Damascus;208 needs immediate leave in 
compliance with a religious tenet; and whose abrupt religious zeal 
is so overpowering that, even if the employer demanded that the 
employee work, the employee could not, as if inhibited by a 
metaphysical wall, as if the prospect of blasphemy were so 
overpowering that it rendered the employee, quite literally, 
incapable of doing what they could otherwise do. 
 
 206. 41 C.F.R. § 60-50.3 (2021); see also U.S. OFF. OF FED. CONT. COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, 
supra note 40, at 114. 
 207. Riggs v. Boeing Co., No. 98-2091, 1999 WL 233285, at *1 (D. Kan. Mar. 4, 1999) 
(collecting cases). 
 208. Acts 9:1–9 (New American Bible). 
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Even if this far-out hypothetical were viable, can a religious 
devotion render someone incapable of working in the same way 
that some disabilities do? I doubt it. At most, employees may 
become unable to work during leave for religious practices (e.g., 
employees whose religion requires them to consume alcohol),209 
but Title VII would still afford leave as an accommodation to such 
employees in the same way that I argue the ADA and similar laws 
would afford leave as an accommodation to employee B. In both 
cases, the employees can work at the start of their leave (i.e., when 
they haven’t started drinking; when B hasn’t undergone anesthesia 
for surgery yet), but they lose that ability during the leave. Hence, 
I contend that Title VII and Executive Order 11,246 actually cohere 
nicely with federal disability accommodation law, as I have 
reconceived of it, as none of these laws require an employer to 
accommodate an employee with involuntary leave when that 
employee, at present, cannot perform the essential functions of the 
job. The only difference is that laws like the ADA explicitly provide 
as much (i.e., via the “qualified individual” provision) whereas the 
nature of laws like Title VII inherently excludes involuntary leaves 
like accommodations for religious beliefs and practices. That said, 
even if I am wrong and there are cases of religious leave where the 
employee unexpectedly and literally cannot work on account of a 
religious belief or practice, but Title VII nonetheless requires that 
the employer accommodate such a leave for lack of any “qualified 
individual” provision, such divergence from federal disability 
accommodation laws could be rationally justified on the basis of a 
value judgment (i.e., federal law should offer more leeway to 
employees’ religious beliefs and practices than it does to their 
disabilities). In other words, federal law remains coherent. 
B. Part-Time and Modified Work Schedules 
Title I of the ADA explicitly states that accommodations “may 
include . . . part-time or modified work schedules.”210 The EEOC 
interprets section 501 of the Rehab Act as requiring the same kind 
of accommodation,211 and the OFCCP’s regulations implementing 
section 503 of the Rehab Act and VEVRAA likewise list “part-time 
 
 209. Yanki Tauber, The Purim Drunk, CHABAD.ORG, https://www.chabad.org/holidays/ 
purim/article_cdo/aid/2814/jewish/The-Purim-Drunk.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2021). 
 210. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (emphasis added). 
 211. EEOC Accommodation Enforcement Guidance, supra note 24, at 2 n.1. 
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or modified work schedules” as permissive accommodations.212 
However, an employee may be unable to perform the essential 
functions of the job when either of these accommodations begins, 
seemingly contradicting the imperative that the employee be a 
“qualified individual.” To the extent possible, provisions of statutes 
should be interpreted “as a harmonious whole rather than at war 
with one another.”213 Hence, we should find a way of reading these 
provisions in harmony if we can. 
For the sake of context, it is helpful to briefly define these 
statutory terms of art as they are not defined by the statutes or any 
of their regulations. “Part-time” means “[e]mployed . . . for part  
of the time or for less than the customary time,”214 and “modified” 
means “[l]imited, altered, [or] qualified.”215 Notice that “part-time” 
work implies less work than the status quo (i.e., full-time), whereas 
a “modified” work schedule could imply more or less work  
than the status quo so long as the amount differs from that  
status quo. Also note that all part-time work is necessarily modified 
work whereas the reverse is not true. Moreover, I note that  
these statutory provisions are materially similar to those requiring 
leave in certain circumstances, meaning they imply only that part-
time and modified schedules may be accommodations without 
clarifying when.  
That being said, to explore these provisions, consider another 
set of five hypothetical employees: (1) Franco (F), who works as a 
prison guard and suffers from a seizure disorder like Carlos, supra 
section I.A.2, but his disorder causes so many seizures that he asks 
to work a part-time or modified work schedule of 35 hours a week, 
recognizing that approximately 5 hours each week, the timing of 
which will be erratic, will be consumed by incapacitating seizures; 
(2) Gina (G), who works as a car saleswoman who has muscular 
dystrophy, requests a part-time work schedule of 10 hours per 
week (worked all on one day or over multiple days; it does not 
 
 212. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-300.2(v)(2)(ii), 60-741.2(u)(2)(ii) (2021). 
 213. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018). 
 214. Part-time, 11 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 65; accord Part-time, 
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 94. 
 215. Modified, 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 65; accord. Modify, WEBSTER’S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2002). Synonyms for modify include change, alter, 
adjust, adapt, amend, revise, refine, and tweak. Modify, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF SYNONYMS AND 
ANTONYMS (3d ed. 2014). 
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matter) instead of 40 hours per week;216 (3) Hiroshi (H), a computer 
programmer with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), 
who requests a modified work schedule to begin in the next few 
weeks that would let him start working 3 hours earlier than his 
coworkers but still work his scheduled 8 hours per day;217 (4) Inez 
(I) a computer programmer who works with Hiroshi, who suffers 
from Parkinson’s Disease and requests a modified work schedule 
to begin in the next few weeks so she starts work 3 hours later than 
her coworkers but still work her scheduled 8 hours per day;218 and 
(5) Julián (J), who works as a paralegal, has leukemia, and asks to 
modify his work schedule so he can take a full day off for 
chemotherapy treatment and work four ten-hour days instead of 
five eight-hour days during one particular week.219 
I classify these employees as follows. At the time his part-time 
or modified work would begin, F is unable to perform the essential 
functions of his job, just as C was unable to perform the essential 
functions of his job when his seizures started. Therefore, for the 
same reasons that C is unqualified, F is unqualified. In contrast, at 
the time that G’s part-time and modified work schedule would 
begin, she would be able to perform the essential functions of her 
job some of the time, but she cannot perform the job full-time. Note 
that I did not clarify whether G needs her accommodation to start 
now or could permit it to begin at some time in the near future.  
I declined to add this element because it does not matter; if working 
10 hours per week as a car saleswoman is reasonable and such a 
schedule imposes no undue hardship on this employer (e.g., the 
employer could hire a new part-time salesperson to pick up the 
slack), the point is that G can work those 10 hours right now, 
whereas F cannot. Accordingly, the law requires that employers 
accommodate G and not F, subject, as usual, to the reasonableness 
and undue hardship inquiries. 
Employees H, I, and J all need modified work schedules. So long 
as it is reasonable for a computer programmer to work an earlier  
 
 216. These facts materially track some of the facts in Pals v. Schepel Buick & GMC Truck, 
Inc., 220 F.3d 495 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 217. These facts materially track Example C in the Modified or Part-Time Schedule section 
of the EEOC’s enforcement guidance. EEOC Accommodation Enforcement Guidance, supra 
note 24, at 17–18 ¶ 22. 
 218. These facts materially track Example B in the same guidance. Id. 
 219. As explained infra, this example differs only in degree to employee D. See supra 
note 60 and accompanying text. 
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or later shift and this modified work schedule would impose no 
undue hardship on this employer, then both H and I can perform 
the essential functions of their jobs earlier or later than their 
coworkers, and employers must accommodate them as such. Put 
another way, when their accommodations would begin, they are 
able to perform the essential functions of their jobs, so they are 
qualified individuals under the law. Similarly, J’s proposed 
modified work schedule looks materially similar to D’s proposed 
leave to attend a doctor’s appointment. The only difference other 
than degree (i.e., J needs a full day off; D needs only a few hours 
off) is that J intends to make up lost time. Fine. As long as it is 
reasonable for a paralegal to work ten-hour days four times per 
week and that modified work schedule would impose no undue 
hardship on this employer, J’s modified work schedule must  
be accommodated. 
In conclusion, statutory provisions sometimes requiring leave 
as an accommodation are not materially distinct from statutory 
provisions sometimes requiring part-time or modified work 
schedules as an accommodation. In both cases, what matters, in 
addition to the reasonableness and undue hardship inquiries, is 
whether the employee can perform the essential functions of the job 
at the time the part-time or modified work schedule begins. In my 
conception, that coherent narrative persists throughout the federal 
disability accommodation laws. 
III. A CONCLUDING CALL TO ACTION 
With the elevation of Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett 
to the bench, the Supreme Court certainly has a textualist majority.220 
 
 220. See Evan Bernick, Judge Amy Coney Barrett on Statutory Interpretation: Textualism, 
Precedent, Judicial Restraint, and the Future of Chevron, YALE J. REG. NOTICE & COMMENT BLOG 
(July 3, 2018), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/judge-amy-coney-barrett-on-statutory-
interpretation-textualism-precedent-judicial-restraint-and-the-future-of-chevron-by-evan-
bernick/; Emily Bazelon & Eric Posner, Who Is Brett Kavanaugh?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/03/opinion/who-is-brett-kavanaugh.html; Jonathan 
H. Adler, Justice Gorsuch’s First Opinions Reveal a Confident Textualist, WASH. POST (June 23, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/23/ 
justice-gorsuchs-first-opinions-reveal-a-confident-textualist/; Scott A. Moss, Judges’ Varied 
Views on Textualism: The Roberts-Alito Schism and the Similar District Judge Divergence  
That Undercuts the Widely Assumed Textualism-Ideology Correlation, 88 U. COLO. L.  
REV. 1 (2017) (generally detailing the varying textualisms of Chief Justice Roberts and  
Justices Alito and Thomas); Anita Krishnakumar, Textualism and Statutory Precedents, 104 VA. 
L. REV. 157, 161 (2018) (describing Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Thomas as 
“self-avowed textualist[s]”). 
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And, while the lower federal courts are largely aligned on 
concluding that employers must provide reasonable leaves as 
accommodations under the federal disability accommodation 
statutes so long as they impose no undue burden, such a conclusion 
is not fait accompli at the High Court. Indeed, the conventional 
analytic through which onlookers assess the federal disability 
accommodation statutes stands poised for textualist attack given 
my thesis. And it is right to attack atextual interpretations. But it is 
also right to redirect our course toward a more just balance of 
employee-employer rights before that can happen. 
Congress and the President must take action to amend Title I  
of the ADA to redefine a “qualified individual” as one who “can  
or may be able to perform” the essential functions of the position, 
thereby permitting leave as an accommodation for employees with 
a disability even if those employees cannot, at present, do the job. 
In so doing, the internal, cross-referential nature of the Rehab Act 
will automatically kick in, giving employees who work for federal 
contractors and subcontractors the right to take leave as an 
accommodation under section 503 of the Rehab Act, too. As such, 
employees would no longer be required to demonstrate a  
present-tense ability to work, although the bounds of 
reasonableness imposed by the statutes would still require the 
reasonable possibility of their return to work eventually. Hence, 
while I contend that the present state of the law requires an 
employee’s ability to work “now and again,” the ideal future state 
of the law would require an ability to work “not now, but again.” 
By redefining Title I of the ADA in this quantitatively minor  
but qualitatively major way, Congress can make a dramatic, 
positive change for employees with a disability before it’s too  
late, thus ensuring a just balance between the rights of workers and 
their employers. 
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